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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents the results of long run labour productivity and GDP growth rate 
projections (until 2050) for each of the 25 EU Member States and provides a detailed 
overview of the forecast methodology used. These projections were undertaken in order to 
provide an internationally comparable macroeconomic framework against which to assess 
the potential economic and fiscal effects of ageing populations. This assessment was carried 
out as part of the work undertaken by the EU’s Economic Policy Committee, in its Ageing 
Working Group, to project the public expenditure implications of ageing on pensions, health 
care, long-term care, unemployment insurance and education.
 
The projections presented in this paper, using a common production function methodology 
for all 25 countries, show the GDP growth rate effects of an assumptions-driven 
extrapolation of recent trends in employment and labour productivity. These base case 
projections reflect the working assumption of “no policy change” and should not therefore 
be seen as forecasts of long run sustainable rates of growth but more as an indication of 
likely developments if past trends were to persist in the future. In overall terms, the EU25 
baseline projection suggests a significant slowdown in potential growth rates in the Union as 
a whole, with the EU25 growth rate projected to fall from around 2 ½ % at present to half 
that rate over the period 2041-2050. While the decline in the growth rate of living standards 
is less dramatic, it is nevertheless significant, with EU25 GDP per capita growth rates 
expected to decline from 2 ¼ % at present to 1 ½ % in the 2040’s. 
Finally, various sensitivity tests are carried out to check the GDP per capita  impact of some 
factors which have been excluded from the baseline scenario for reasons of simplicity or 
because of a lack of consensus in the academic literature. Some of the interesting conclusions 
that emerge from these sensitivity tests include : 
• Firstly, the GDP per capita impact of changes in the participation rate assumption 
used in the projections is much greater than for assumed changes in the share of  
part-time employment (i.e. in average hours worked per worker).  
• Secondly, the negative effect of a change in the age-structure of the population is 
fairly limited, although it is accepted that the labour productivity of an individual is 
likely to decline after the age of 55. A very strong fall in the productivity of older 
workers compared with that of prime-age workers would be required to significantly 
depress total labour productivity. Such an outcome, on the basis of current evidence, 
appears rather unlikely.  
• Thirdly, changing the TFP growth rate targets (e.g. use of the 1990’s average instead 
of the long-term 1970-2004 average) could strongly affect the projections. 
• Finally, an assumption of  productivity convergence in levels substantially alters the 
projections for most EU10 countries but leaves the EU15 almost unchanged.  
JEL classification: O47, D24, J11, J21, J26, H55 
Keywords: productivity, GDP growth, production function, long-term projections, ageing populations, 
pension reforms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, the ECOFIN Council gave the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) a 
mandate to produce a new set of long-run budgetary projections by mid-2005 for all 
twenty five Member States covering pensions, health care, long-term care, education, 
unemployment transfers and, if possible, contributions to pensions/social security 
systems. To this end, it was agreed that the budgetary projections should be made on 
the basis of common demographic projections, to be provided by Eurostat, and using 
macroeconomic assumptions to be validated in the EPC ‘s Working Group on Ageing 
(EPC-AWG) 1. It was also accepted that the projections would be made on the basis 
of a “no policy change” assumption, i.e. reflecting enacted legislation, including 
provisions which were expected to enter into force in a phased manner over time. The 
guiding principles of simplicity, comparability, consistency, prudence and 
transparency have underpinned the work of DG ECFIN and the EPC-AWG in 
preparing the new common budgetary projections.  
 
This study presents the production function methodology, which was chosen by the 
EPC-AWG as the preferred approach for projecting labour productivity and GDP 
until 2050. In terms of structure, the study starts with some stylised facts about labour 
productivity growth, its main driving forces and the issues to be considered when 
making projections over such a long time horizon.  It goes on to present the essential 
details of the various approaches which could be employed to make such  projections, 
as well as providing a detailed overview of the specific methodology used in the 
present paper. Regarding the latter, the paper describes both the production function 
framework and the set of assumptions used to project its components over the 
medium to long run. On the basis of this agreed framework, the paper goes on to 
present the baseline projections which it produces for the EU25, EU15 and EU10 
(new Member States) aggregates, whilst drawing some conclusions regarding the 
cross country differences as well as discussing a series of alternative scenarios. The 
essential conclusions to be drawn from the analysis are provided in the final section, 
with the detailed projections for each of the 25 Member States given in Annex 1.  
 
                                                 
1 The Economic Policy Committee (EPC) is composed of senior officials from national economics and finance 
ministries and central banks and serves to prepare the work of the ECOFIN Council. The EPC’s Ageing Working 
Group (henceforth EPC-AWG) was established to study the implications of ageing populations for the public 
finances in areas such as pensions, health and education. In 2001, the European Commission and the EPC-AWG 
produced a first set of comparable projections on the long-term budgetary impact of ageing through increased 
expenditure on pensions, health care and long-term care. See European Commission–EPC (2001). 
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 2. STYLISED FACTS ABOUT LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND ITS DRIVING 
FORCES 
2.1. Historical trends in labour productivity  
The simplest observable measure of labour productivity is GDP per person employed. 
This measure is particularly relevant in the context of the budgetary projections since, 
together with the projections of the labour force and the NAIRU, it permits the 
calculation of the total output growth rate over the projection horizon.  
Table 1 : Labour productivity growth by sub-periods (%) 
 1960-
1970 
1970-
1980 
1980-
1990 
1990-
2000 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2003 
1973-
2003 
BE 4.4 3.2 1.9 1.3 1.1 1.4 0.4 1.7 
DK 3.5 1.6 1.2 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.4 
DE 4.2 2.5 1.3 1.6 2.1 1.1 0.7 1.5 
EL 9.3 3.9 -0.3 1.6 0.7 2.5 3.7 1.3 
ES 6.7 4.2 1.9 1.3 1.9 0.7 0.5 1.9 
FR 4.9 2.8 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.3 1.8 
IE 4.2 3.7 3.8 3.4 2.9 3.9 3.1 3.5 
IT 6.2 2.6 1.7 1.6 2.1 1.1 -0.3 1.6 
LU 2.9 1.4 3.2 2.1 1.3 2.8 -2.2 1.7 
NL 3.8 2.7 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.2 0.0 1.4 
AT 5.1 3.0 2.3 2.0 2.1 1.9 0.8 2.1 
PT 6.2 4.7 3.1 2.1 2.3 1.9 0.2 2.5 
FI 4.4 3.5 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.4 0.9 2.5 
SE 3.9 1.2 1.5 2.7 2.9 2.5 0.8 1.6 
UK 2.7 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.7 1.6 1.4 1.7 
CY n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.5 1.4 n.a. 
CZ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.5 2.0 n.a. 
EE n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.6 4.6 n.a. 
HU n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.8 2.8 n.a. 
LV n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.9 5.2 n.a. 
LT n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.9 9.3 n.a. 
MT n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.8 -0.2 n.a. 
PL n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.7 3.0 n.a. 
SK n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.5 3.6 n.a. 
SI n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.8 2.8 n.a. 
EU-10 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.8 3.0 n.a. 
EU-25 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.5 0.8 n.a. 
EU-15 4.6 2.6 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.3 0.6 1.7 
Standard 
deviation         
EU-10 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
1.8 
 
2.4 n.a. 
EU-25 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
1.7 
 
2.3 n.a. 
EU-15 1.6 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.3 0.6 
US 2.3 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.3 2.0 1.9 1.3 
JP 8.6 3.7 3.0 1.1 0.8 1.4 1.4 2.1 
CA 2.4 1.1 0.9 1.7 1.3 2.0 0.6 1.0 
Sources: AMECO database, European Commission. 
Productivity growth has been rather uneven across the countries and sub-periods 
considered (see Table 1). During the 1960s and 1970s, the pattern of growth across 
countries was broadly consistent with the conventional “convergence” view, in 
particular that countries lagging behind in terms of labour productivity gradually 
closed the gap relative to the United States.  
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 This convergence process appears to have continued in the 1980s and the first half of 
the 1990s, albeit to a much lesser extent. Conversely, the convergence process 
between the EU15 and the US has clearly reversed in the second half of the 1990s and 
the early 2000s2. This is particularly true for some of the larger EU15 countries, 
although a number of the smaller EU15 Member States (Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden) have recorded a higher productivity growth rate 
compared with that of the US over the second half of the 1990s, enabling them to 
narrow the gap in terms of productivity levels. This development partly corresponds 
to the convergence of labour productivity growth rates within the EU15, with the 
standard deviation passing from 1.0% in the 1970s to 0.6% in the 1990s. However, 
this measure of dispersion seems to have risen in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. 
Looking at the new member States (EU10), their growth rates of labour productivity 
appear to be much higher (3.8% on average) than those of the existing Member States 
(1.3%) during the 1990s, which reflects the catching-up (or convergence) process in 
these economies.  
2.2. Driving forces behind productivity developments  
The main factors driving trend productivity growth derived from the standard Cobb-
Douglas production function relate to labour input, capital input and technological 
progress, i.e. the residual which cannot be explained by the quantity and quality of 
either labour or capital. Several factors are worth considering in more detail.  
Changes in hours worked : The sharp decline in hours worked per worker in the 
1990s may explain why hourly labour productivity was higher than productivity per 
person employed in most of the continental European countries. Figures available for 
the euro area indicate that the growth in labour productivity per person employed is 
0.6% points lower than labour productivity per hour worked in the three time periods 
considered in Table 2, which underscores the effect of the decline in average hours 
worked per person employed.  
Table 2 : The effect of changes in hours worked on labour productivity growth (average annual changes)  
       Period Euro area US 
Productivity growth per person employed (%) 1982-1989 2.0 1.4 
 1990-1995 1.7 1.2 
 1996-2001 1.1 1.7 
    
Productivity growth per hour worked (%) 1982-1989 2.6 1.2 
 1990-1995 2.3 1.2 
 1996-2001 1.7 2.0 
    
Effect of changes in hours worked  1982-1989 -0.6 0.2 
 1990-1995 -0.6 0.0 
 1996-2001 -0.6 -0.3 
Source: ECB; August 2002 ECB Monthly Bulletin 
 
                                                 
2 See also European Commission (2003). For the 2000s, differences in productivity growth across countries are 
influenced by differences in cyclical positions. The slowdown in economic activity in the EU as a whole is partly 
responsible for the lower rate of labour productivity growth compared to the late 1990s. 
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 Improvements in the average “human capital” of persons employed. As shown by 
the OECD3, human capital can be proxied by the proportion of workers ranked by 
educational attainment and weighted by their relative wages. However, the rise in the 
overall skill level of those in employment conceals two different effects:  
- better education of the working-age population: the proportion of those 
attaining tertiary education has increased in most countries since the 1970s 
and in particular over the 1990s;   
- the exclusion of the low skilled from employment: in addition to the increased 
skills of the working-age population, the high labour productivity growth 
recorded in the 1980s and at the start of the 1990s was partly attributable in a 
number of EU countries to the massive unemployment of low-skilled workers. 
Conversely, the widening of the employment base (increasing employment 
among the low skilled) in the 1990s explained in part the slower productivity 
growth in some countries, such as Spain, compared to the previous decades. 
Thus, high productivity growth can mirror underemployment and slack in the 
labour market. 
Capital deepening: apart from labour inputs (quality and quantity), the second main 
channel which can account for labour productivity gains is the accumulation of 
physical capital. For instance, the high level of investment in the new Member States 
(public infrastructure, private investment) following the restructuring and  
privatisation of state owned-companies as well as the stimulus provided by large FDI 
inflows has contributed to the relatively high productivity growth rates in these 
countries. This fast capital deepening corresponds to the transition phase of these 
economies, which is somewhat similar to the reconstruction period in Western Europe 
after the Second World War, characterised by a fast physical capital accumulation. As 
regards recent trends in productivity growth, and in particular the divergence in 
growth rates between the EU and the US since the mid-1990s, the following issues 
related to capital accumulation appear to have played an important role :  
- the role of information and communication technology (ICT) in the process 
of accumulation of physical capital should be emphasised, as it could explain 
a part of the productivity gap between the US and the EU. Two effects can be 
identified: capital accumulation in ICT-producing sectors (of which the size 
increased fastest in the US, Ireland, Finland and Sweden in the 1990s) and 
capital accumulation across the whole economy through large investments in 
ICT. These two mechanisms are (at least partly) responsible for the marked 
divergence between the US and the EU over the second half of the 1990s.  
- lack of non-ICT productive investment: the lack of such investment, 
especially relative to the US in the second half of the 1990’s, may have also 
led to the EU’s disappointing productivity performance. Indeed, the 
investment rate in the EU displayed a clear and worrying downward trend in 
the 1990s. 
- capital-labour substitution towards more employment intensive growth: the 
smaller non-ICT capital accumulation in the EU appears to be also due to a 
                                                 
3 See OECD (2003). 
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 reversal of the employment-unfriendly capital/labour substitution of earlier 
periods. This move towards more employment may entail a temporary 
reduction in measured productivity growth, but this should not be regarded as 
a trade-off, since a higher employment rate implies an unambiguous increase 
in GDP per capita with no negative implications for long-run productivity 
growth in the existing workforce. In neoclassical economic growth theory, 
this long-run neutrality proposition is embodied in the concept of labour-
augmenting technical progress4.  
Technological progress, embodied by Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth. TFP 
is conventionally calculated as the Solow's residual, which corresponds to the 
component of productivity growth which cannot be explained by changes in the 
quality and quantity of labour and capital. Three stylised facts can be mentioned. 
First, the slowdown of TFP growth in most OECD economies since 1973 to half the 
levels observed in the 1950-1973 period is still largely unexplained. Second, higher 
TFP growth in Europe vis-à-vis the US in the period 1973-1995 probably reflects 
convergence towards the leading economy. Third, TFP growth in the US has been 
strong compared to the EU since the mid-1990s. Strong ICT investment is only part 
of the story since US productivity growth persisted during the most recent downturn 
when ICT investment and demand fell dramatically. The combination of ICT 
investment and organisational changes (new processes, corporate culture, better 
knowledge and information dissemination, etc) could explain the good TFP 
performance in the US. There are however still many open questions regarding long-
term trends and prospects for TFP. Will the “new economy” be sustainable in the US 
in the long-run and will the EU catch up towards the US in the coming decades? 
Other factors (e.g. changes in the sectoral composition of the economy). The shift 
of OECD economies towards larger service sectors mechanically induces a decline in 
the overall labour productivity growth rate, as on average services display lower 
productivity gains compared with the manufacturing sector (mainly due to lower 
capital-intensity). However, the growing share of ICT-producing sectors (both in 
manufacturing and services) may better explain the productivity results in some 
OECD countries.  
 
2.3. 
                                                
Issues to be considered when thinking about long-term productivity 
projections  
2.3.1. Economic convergence : theoretical and empirical Evidence   
 
Various theories abound concerning the speed with which less developed economies 
develop over time, and whether if, or when, they converge to the income levels of the 
most advanced economies. Some economists, such as Romer (1986) and other 
advocates of the new endogenous growth theories, are quite pessimistic regarding the 
 
4 In essence, technical progress raises the productivity of both workers and machines. The increase in labour 
productivity leads to a rise in real wages, which causes some people to work more and others less, with a broadly 
neutral impact on overall employment.  At the same time, higher wages and the increase in the productivity of 
capital cause firms to increase their investment in physical capital.  Thus, there is a balanced growth path, along 
which labour productivity, real wages and the capital intensity of production grow at the same rate, driven by 
technical progress. 
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 likelihood of convergence occurring even over long periods of time since productive 
technology is, in their view, of the increasing, as opposed to the more normally 
assumed decreasing, returns to scale variety and consequently once a country 
becomes a global technology leader it tends to remain so over extended periods of 
time due to knowledge spillovers or learning-by-doing effects.  At the other end of 
the scale are economists such as J. Sachs and A. Warner (1995), who are quite 
optimistic concerning the potential for catching-up, with in their view an adequate 
policy framework being a sufficient condition for that to occur.   
 
For Sachs et al.(1995) those countries which consistently implement efficient 
economic policies, including adherence to an open trading regime which is attractive 
to FDI flows and technology transfers, as well as establishing the normal institutions 
of a market economy, such as a properly functioning legal system with adequate 
protection for private property rights, will over time experience convergence. This 
view consequently stresses the importance of efficient economic institutions in 
ensuring growth and convergence. On this view of the world, if countries do not 
succeed in growing it has probably more to do with poor policy choices rather than 
technology deficiencies or low initial endowments of human capital.  
 
Between these two extreme views is the one which is the most followed in empirical 
analysis and the one used in the EPC-AWG approach to make long-run projections, 
namely the Solow neoclassical growth framework, which predicts what is referred to 
as "conditional" convergence. The theory suggests that convergence does occur but 
not necessarily to the same higher level of income, since the growth potential of 
countries differs essentially because of differences in respective savings rates and 
population changes. When one allows for these differences in terms of the long run 
growth potential of countries, then one finds that poorer countries do in fact grow 
relatively faster and consequently do converge over time, but not necessarily to the 
same steady state standard of living. Furthermore, studies have found that the greater 
the gap between the present income levels of countries and their future potential,  the 
faster they will grow. According to this line of reasoning, which has been termed "the 
"convergence clubs" hypothesis, in the long-run the per capita incomes of countries that 
are similar in their structural characteristic converge only if their initial conditions (their 
initial per capita output levels) are similar as well. Countries with different structural 
characteristic converge to different steady state. The theoretical support is provided by 
the endogenous models and in particular by models of poverty trap5. 
 
Given the wide choice of models to choose from, it is clear that the empirical 
evidence becomes a major deciding factor in terms of which model to use for any 
long run growth analysis. In overall terms, it would appear that the approach which 
has enjoyed the greatest degree of support in the literature is the neoclassical view.  
There is in fact now widespread empirical acceptance that "conditional" convergence 
does occur across countries. Typical of this line of research is a 1992 study by 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil which showed, using cross-country regression analysis, 
that the neoclassical growth model could explain nearly 80% of the differences in 
                                                 
5 This body of new theoretical works on multiple equilibria predict the formation of "convergence clubs" (with 
member countries converging towards each other and diverging away from different clubs) and the polarisation of 
the distribution into "twin peaks" of rich and poor. In these new models, the dynamical system is characterised by 
multiple locally stable steady-state equilibria. See  Quah (1995), Quah(1996). 
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 international standards of living, using just three explanatory variables, namely 
population growth rates, savings rates and an indicator of human capital.   
 
In addition, papers by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), Islam (1995) and Sala-i-Martin 
(1996), amongst many others, all found evidence for ‘conditional convergence’  for 
‘developed economies’ including the EU, with rates of convergence of 2% per annum 
being typical for these studies.  With regard to the debate on openness and growth, a 
number of studies, such as Sachs and Warner (1995) and Ben-David (1996), using a 
modified neoclassical framework, found strong evidence of per-capita income 
convergence for open economies with strong trading links, a scenario which is typical 
of the EU, Japan and a number of the fast ageing economies.   
 
In this regard, while the analysis undertaken in the present paper is predicated on the 
conditional convergence thesis, the importance of an appropriate policy framework is 
also stressed, including the role of policy institutions, along the lines of the arguments 
put forward by Sachs and Warner.  In overall terms, the key points to be retained 
from the convergence literature are the following. 
 
• Convergence is not assured – it is conditional on rates of capital accumulation 
and population growth and, at a wider level, on appropriate and efficient policy 
making institutions. As the experiences of Japan and the EU show, effective 
economic policies and institutions have an important role to play in the growth 
and convergence processes of these countries.   
 
• The speed with which countries grow is dictated by their own long-run growth 
potential and their own initial conditions. While fast rates of growth can be 
achieved, countries should be realistic about the speed with which convergence 
will take place – in fact that process normally occurs at a much slower pace than 
most countries assume.   
 
• On the basis of the empirical evidence presented above, it would appear that the 
road to prosperity is more difficult and the role of savings and investment, both 
in physical and human forms of capital, is more important in determining steady 
state income levels than originally thought back in the 1950s, with the 
accumulation of all forms of capital, including knowledge, being crucial to the 
relative growth performance of countries. 
 
As an operational consequence for the projections, we will refrain from assuming the 
existence of convergence in levels. As a much weaker form of convergence, we 
however make country–specific TFP converge in growth rate, allowing for some 
degree of  technology diffusion. By contrast, labour input developments will remain 
very different across countries, as driven by differing demographics, cohort effects 
and impacts of recent reforms.  
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 2.3.2. What impact is ageing likely to have on long run labour productivity trends  
in general and on capital deepening and TFP developments specifically ?  
 
Direct compositional impact on overall labour productivity levels: Population ageing 
is often said to lead to a  deterioration in the average quality of labour input and 
thereby to lower aggregate productivity: as the productivity of individuals is alleged 
to decline with age, the rising share of older workers should reduce overall 
productivity, even though age specific productivity remains constant. However, the 
profile of productivity by age is a complex issue since the identification of the age 
effect is blurred by cohort and selection effects6.  
On the basis of a survey of human resource executives, Barth et al. (1993) finds that 
older workers were seen as being more reliable, having better skills and adopting 
better work-friendly behaviour than their younger counterparts. Using an employer-
employee dataset for the US, Hellerstein et al. (1999) shows that prime-age workers 
(aged 35-54) are equally as productive as younger workers. However, those aged 55 
and over are less productive than younger workers. Surveying supervisors’ ratings, 
work-sample tests, analyses of employer-employee datasets and other approaches 
assessing individual productivity across age groups, Skirbekk (2003) finds evidence 
suggesting “that productivity tends to follow an inverted U-shaped profile, where 
significant decreases take place from around 50 years of age. An important cause of 
these age-related productivity declines is likely to be reductions in cognitive abilities 
across the life span. Some abilities, such as perceptual speed, show relatively large 
decreases from a young age, while others, like verbal abilities, show only small 
changes throughout the working life. Although older individuals have longer 
experience, they learn at a slower pace and have reductions in their memory and 
reasoning abilities”. Prskawetz et al. (2005) also argue that the analysis should not 
only consider the age variation in individual skills (supply for abilities), but also the 
changing importance of these skills in the labour market (shifting demand for 
abilities). For instance, cognitive abilities seem to have gained much prominence in 
firms' needs compared with physical strength, especially in services-based economy.   
This bell-shaped relationship between age and individual productivity is broadly 
confirmed by Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) and Hansen (1993) for the US and Meghir 
and Whitehouse (1996) for the UK, which find that younger workers with little 
experience and older workers are both less productive than prime-age staff. However, 
Borsch-Supan (2003) shows that, even when assuming a pronounced bell shaped 
relationship, the projected fall in aggregate labour productivity remains fairly small. 
Borsch-Supan (2006) also argues that there is no evidence of dramatic productivity 
decline in the 45-60 age bracket, as the negative effect of age is offset by the positive 
effect of experience, which becomes more important in a service and knowledge 
society7.  
                                                 
6 An additional problem arises from the fact that the age-profile of productivity is deduced from that of hourly 
earnings, although some gaps between wages and productivity might occur especially for the older age cohorts 
(Hellerstein et al. 1999).  
7 The combination of a pure "age effect" and experience also explained the bell-shape of the relationship between 
age and productivity: those aged 15-24 are young but less experienced, while those 50-64 are older (less fit) but 
much more experienced. Borsch-Supan (2006) provides interesting evidence for a truck assembly plant based on 
the percentage of "errors" made by workers in the production process and concludes that the "error" curve is 
relatively "flat" across age.  
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Effects on total factor productivity : One of the critical assumptions to be made in 
relation to assessing the long-term economic impact of demographic change is the 
extent to which increased labour efficiency can offset the reduction in the rate of 
growth of the labour supply. This is a highly complex issue and one which has 
received a lot of attention in the empirical literature. From a review of the latter it 
would appear difficult to establish with any certainty whether demographic change 
will be positive or negative for productivity. According to one strand of research it 
could be detrimental to productivity growth if an ageing labour force turns out to be 
less dynamic and innovative (e.g. Barrel 2005) whereas other researchers take the 
alternative view that technological change may be boosted to offset the negative 
implications of the ensuing relative scarcity of labour. 
 
Simon (1986), Wattenberg (1987), Romer (1990) and Jones (2002)8 take the former 
view and argue that technical progress is slowed down by the anticipated ageing of 
the population because of the above mentioned loss of dynamism and since declining 
markets for capital goods ensures that innovation is less profitable. Barth et al. (1993) 
also shows that, notwithstanding their greater dedication at work, as well as their 
longer experience and better skills, older workers are considered by a panel of 
employers to be less flexible in accepting new assignments and less receptive to 
training, which may hamper innovation and the full exploitation of technical progress. 
Skirbekk (2003) and Prskawetz et al.(2005) note that older workers are likely to show 
less adaptability to changing working methods and less ability to learn in general. 
Denis, Mc Morrow and Röger (2004b) show that TFP growth could slow down 
substantially given the lesser human capital accumulation (embedded in a skrinking 
young population) and a lower labour amount devoted to R&D activities.  
 
Disney (1996) takes the opposite view that ageing will have no adverse effects on 
productivity growth. In addition, in earlier research by Cutler et al (1990), empirical 
evidence was presented to support the contention that labour scarcity induces 
increased innovation i.e. the “scarcity is the mother of invention” argument. This 
scarcity view assumes that in a situation of relatively slow population growth, there is 
an acceleration, on a per capita basis, in human capital accumulation. In their cross-
national analysis of 29 non-OPEC countries for the period 1960-1985, Cutler et al 
estimate that a decline in the annual labour force growth rate of 1 percentage point is 
associated with about a 0.5 percentage point increase in productivity growth. 
Furthermore, this view of Cutler et al. is supported in the context of ongoing research 
in relation to endogenous growth rate theories. For example, Fougère and Mérette 
(1997) suggest that investment priorities may change with population ageing, with the 
latter phenomenon increasing the incentive for human capital investment, resulting in 
a redistribution of investment away from physical towards human capital, with 
potentially favourable long-run effects in terms of the rate of economic growth. The 
empirical interest in this whole area of endogenous growth theory has been enormous 
in recent years, with the latter stressing that the total factor productivity (TFP) 
element of economic growth partially emanates from sources which are amenable to 
policy influence. If it is accepted that the behaviour of economic agents is susceptible 
to productivity enhancing policy interventions, then this would represent a major 
                                                 
8 Jones takes the view that TFP is negatively affected by the ageing process and estimates that a 1% point decline 
in the OECD’s population growth rate lowers the growth rate of TFP by .05 to .3% points. 
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 departure from the standard neo-classical view which postulates that technical 
progress is exogenously determined. 
 
Capital accumulation : One can assess whether the option is available of reducing the 
impact of ageing on potential growth and living standards via capital accumulation 
alone ? On the negative side, from a capital widening perspective, with the expected 
slowdown in GDP growth rates, due to falls in labour force growth, investment 
should be negatively affected.  This was the historical pattern, with the productivity-
induced slowdown in GDP growth over the last number of decades resulting in less 
investment opportunities in relative terms. On the other hand, savings and investment 
have a potentially important role to play in helping to offset the effects of rising 
dependency burdens, via capital deepening9, with policies aimed at generating greater 
levels of savings leading to lower real interest rates, additional productive investment 
and stronger long-run growth.  The negative impact on living standards due to the 
reduced rate of growth of the labour supply could in this way be potentially offset by 
higher rates of labour productivity growth emanating from a rising capital stock. 
However, this investment route to boosting output appears somewhat unrealistic, 
since not only is the national savings rate not expected to rise to finance the required 
higher investment rate, the most likely outcome, especially if one subscribes to the 
life cycle hypothesis, is for a fall in national savings, with the latter fall again largely 
demographically induced10. Moreover, capital accumulation may have feed-backs on 
Total Factor Productivity: If “vintage” effects are allowed for, the role of investment 
in the overall growth process over the next 50 years is greatly enhanced, with 
investment not only adding to the technical capacity of the economy via increases in 
the capital stock but also impacting on productivity via embodiment effects, with new 
“vintages” of capital adding to overall efficiency levels.  
 
Consequently, prudence demands action to boost national savings rates over the 
medium to long run, with action in terms of government savings / dissaving allied to 
incentives to boost private sector retirement savings, being the most effective avenues 
to be explored.  Since savings and investment coupled with technical progress are the 
key ingredients that influence long-term living standards, it is important to stress not 
only their individual contributions but also the possible links between investment and 
productivity developments.  
 
 
                                                 
9 The future evolution of the capital to labour ratio depends crucially on real interest rates.  Two offsetting factors 
are at work in terms of ageing – declining labour forces require less investment but the savings rate of an ageing 
population is going down. Which effect dominates is controversial.  The majority of models predict a slight 
decline in real interest rates. However, work by Kotlikoff et al (2001) suggests the opposite conclusion of an 
increase in interest rates. 
10 In addition, the capital deepening option inevitably runs into problems of diminishing returns, with domestic 
over-investment occurring.  A good example of this is the case of Japan.  Following a sharp increase in the real 
investment to GDP ratio in Japan in the 1960’s, this ratio has remained at very elevated levels over the subsequent 
period to 2000, although the ratio has been on a clear downward path since the beginning of the 1990’s. As a 
result of these investment trends, the capital intensity of the Japanese economy has risen sharply, with the capital-
output ratio close to doubling over the last 30 years, rising from around 2 in 1970 to 3.7 in 200010.  Over this 
period the capital-output ratio in the EU has been broadly stable at around 3, with the US ratio remaining in a 
relatively narrow range of 2½-3.  Since the profit share in the EU, US and Japan is roughly equivalent, the capital-
output ratio is a reasonable indicator of the relative efficiency/profitability of investment in the different 
countries10.  On the basis of this indicator it would appear that with a structurally high rate of savings, Japan is 
under increasing pressure to invest abroad in order to avoid exacerbating the problem of declining rates of return 
on its domestic investments. 
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 To conclude this section, therefore, the empirical evidence linking ageing directly to 
productivity trends is far from convincing, with even doubts regarding whether the 
association or direction of any effect is positive or negative. In these circumstances it 
seems prudent to take a rather “middle of the road” view with regard to future 
efficiency gains in terms of the projections work to be described in sections 4 and 5.  
 
3. EVALUATION OF THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR MAKING LONG-RUN 
PRODUCTIVITY PROJECTIONS 
3.1. Purely mechanical projections  
This section intends to provide a brief survey of the current state of practice. It 
describes the two main approaches that can be used for projecting labour productivity 
growth, that is a “purely mechanical” approach and an economic approach. Within 
the first approach there are two main methodologies which are the extrapolation of 
past/recent trend growth and convergence to a benchmark.  
3.1.1. Extrapolation of past/recent trend growth  
An approach consisting of extrapolating past trend growth has the merit of being 
simple and reasonable if the growth rate of productivity is computed over a long and 
fairly homogeneous time period, e.g. the period starting from the first oil shocks of 
1973, rather than the very recent past which has been very heavily affected by the 
business cycle. Past experience has also shown that annual productivity growth varies 
quite a lot from one decade to another and that extrapolating the trend labour 
productivity in the first half of the 1990s to the second half of the 1990s would have 
led to large forecasting errors (around -0.8 p.p. per year for the whole EU), which 
cannot be explained fully by changing cyclical conditions.  
This simple approach has been used by several public and private bodies involved in 
pension projections. One of these, for example, is the Board of Trustees in the U.S., 
which reports each year on the current and projected financial condition of the Social 
Security program, which is financed through the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 
Trust Funds. This was also the de facto approach followed by the AWG in the 
previous exercise. In the 2001 projection exercise11, labour productivity growth 
(measured by GDP per worker) for each country converges towards an annual rate of 
1¾ per cent between 2020 and 2030. Some catch-up is allowed for initially low-
productivity countries such as Portugal, although in this case the assumptions for 
productivity growth were very high. Although this was not explicitly mentioned, this 
rate is very close to that recorded between 1973-2003 for the EU as a whole (around 
1.7%) and corresponds to the median of the bracket 1.4%-1.9% in which most annual 
productivity growth averages of highly developed EU countries are contained 
(Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom). Small countries such as Portugal, Finland and 
Ireland displayed much higher rates, which may reflect the "new economy" 
phenomenon and/or convergence processes. In the sensitivity analysis, labour 
productivity growth was assumed to be 0.5% lower/higher than in the baseline 
                                                 
11 These assumptions are broadly the same as those used by both the OECD and the EPC-AWG projections. See 
European Commission-EPC (2001).. 
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 scenario, which roughly corresponds to the standard deviation of productivity growth 
across EU countries in the 1990s (+0.6%). 
3.1.2. Convergence to a benchmark 
This alternative approach could be particularly useful with a view to projecting 
productivity growth in the catching-up countries, for example in some of the acceding 
countries which are going through a process of real economic convergence. This 
approach allows one to take into account the fact that some countries may be far from 
the steady state and that trend (medium-term) productivity may strongly differ from 
long-term productivity. Moreover, it tackles a shortcoming of slavishly extrapolating 
past trends, as the latter may lead to some incoherence, such as assuming growing 
divergence in absolute levels of productivity between OECD countries. In an 
increasingly integrated global economy, with free movement of capital and transfers 
of technology, sustained divergences in levels of productivity seem unlikely. 
In this setting, the choice of the benchmark (US, EU as a whole, EU excluding some 
catching-up countries, etc.) and the horizon of convergence are crucial. However, this 
method can appear too mechanical, as specific factors may hinder the convergence in 
some countries. Moreover, the process of convergence may be even unexpectedly 
reversed (for example, Japan vis-à-vis the US in the second half of the 1990s).  
 
3.2. 
                                                
Economic approaches : considering the determinants of productivity 
By taking stock of the upward and downward risks, an economic approach is often 
used to allow the productivity forecast to deviate from the trend labour productivity 
or trend TFP seen over past periods.  
3.2.1. Judgmental approach: balance of upward and downward risks  
 
A judgemental approach would involve the introduction of deviations from past trend 
productivity growth based on an assessment of the upside/downside risks for the 
productivity growth facing each country. Table 3 lists the main downward and 
upward risks associated with productivity developments that could be taken on board 
in such an assessment. Although this approach is interesting, it remains highly 
speculative given the high level of uncertainty and the problem of quantification. It 
cannot justify per se a strong deviation from the past trend. 
Based on the factors outlined in Table 3, it is very hard to draw clear cut conclusions 
on the prospects facing most EU countries in the coming decades as there are risks on 
both sides. A major uncertainty over the long-run emanates from the effect of ageing 
populations per se on productivity growth. The theoretical and empirical literature 
does not reach firm conclusions about the magnitude of the effect, although on 
balance the overall impact might be rather negative (see Annex 2). Several effects on 
TFP are at play. It has been argued that the marginal productivity of workers tends to 
start to decline when they reach their early fifties12.   
 
 
12  See note ECFIN/213/04-EN entitled “ECFIN’s Global Growth Scenario 2000-2050” (presented to the EPC)-
AWG).  
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 Table 3 . Balance of risks for productivity growth in the EU 
Nature of the risks Component of productivity affected Horizon of the 
effect 
Downward risks  
Further increases in the part-time employment 
rate (especially in countries where the 
participation rate is low) + continuation of long-
lasting trend towards lower collective working 
hours. 
Decreasing average hours worked per person 
employed 
Medium-run (effect not 
negligible in some 
countries) 
Labour market reforms and continued wage 
moderation should foster labour deepening. 
Decreasing  capital intensity (K/L) Medium-run (fairly 
important effect) 
Labour market reforms helping the low-skilled 
to join the labour market. 
Decreasing the average skill of those employed 
(lower human capital) 
Medium-run 
Growing share of services sector (displaying 
relatively low productivity growth compared to 
manufacturing). 
Decreasing  capital intensity (K/L). Long-run (small effect) 
Impact of an ageing population on innovation 
and entrepreneurship. 
Decreasing TFP through a less dynamic and 
innovative society + potential impact on capital 
intensity due to the disinvestment of the elderly 
(life cycle theory). 
Long-run 
 
Upward risks   
Product market reforms (including increasing 
R&D and deepening the connections between 
academia and firms) and increasing competition, 
in particular in the new and acceding Member 
States. 
Increasing TFP by stimulating innovation 
(strengthening innovative capacity) + possible 
accumulation of physical capital induced by the 
short-term efficiency gains (dynamic efficiency) 
Long-run/Medium run 
Positive technology shock (ICT revolution): 
slow catching-up towards the US level of 
productivity through an increase in the share of 
the ICT sector plus greater use of ICT in the rest 
of the economy. 
Increasing both TFP and capital intensity Long-run/Medium run 
Some labour market reforms, such as the 
reduction of adjustment rigidities and the 
promotion of flexible working time 
arrangements, may further increase  innovative 
capacity by favouring organisational change. 
Increasing TFP by stimulating organisational 
innovation and via the circulation/utilisation of 
innovative techniques within firms. 
Long-run/Medium run 
Increasing the average educational attainment of 
the working-age population 
Increasing the average skill of those employed 
(higher human capital) 
Long-run 
 
The enthusiasm for reform and overall levels of dynamism and innovation in an 
economy may be detrimentally affected by having an older labour force. Moreover, 
when this ageing of the labour force is combined with the much slower rates of 
capital accumulation which are expected to occur, leading in turn to an increase in the 
mean age of the capital stock, the outlook for TFP could be significantly worse. An 
increase in the average age of the capital stock in an economy is generally considered 
to be negative for labour productivity since continuing investment in new equipment 
is essential for incorporating labour-embodied technical progress into the production 
process (i.e. “vintage” effects).  
 
3.2.2. Partial equilibrium analyses: estimating the effects of different factors on 
productivity.  
Judgemental assessment is based on experts’ knowledge but lacks strong analytical 
grounds. Alternatively, econometric analysis can separately be run on each major 
variable likely to explain productivity growth over time. This comes down to the 
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 examination of productivity determinants, other things remaining equal, in a partial 
equilibrium framework. In essence, this approach assesses the relative merits of the 
major hypotheses for explaining productivity: the role played by the regulatory 
environment (product, labour and financial markets); the degree of openness of 
economies; the efficiency of knowledge production (R&D and education); the 
determinants of physical investment levels; and finally the role played by 
demographics. More specifically, ageing is expected to operate through the following 
main channels: expenditure pressures on the public finances; “life-cycle” effects on 
private savings behaviour, as well as Ricardian equivalence effects operating through 
the deterioration in public savings; labour supply implications; potential impact on 
capital accumulation; effects on total factor productivity and finally, the equilibrating 
role of interest rates and exchange rates and shifts in external balances. While this 
approach is interesting and elucidating in terms of highlighting the key influences at 
work, it suffers from the fact that it excludes the crucial systemic effects of ageing, 
such as behavioural changes and shifts in financial market variables, which ideally 
must be taken into account in determining the final economic impact of ageing.  
 
A similar method has been used by the OECD (2003), and Bassanini et al.(2001)13 to 
estimate the long-run effects on productivity (output per working-age person). The 
OECD ran pool-time series regressions including macroeconomic variables, the tax 
burden, business R&D, tax expenditure, etc.  
 
3.2.3. General equilibrium approach  
An alternative to the partial equilibrium analysis is found in the general equilibrium 
approach, such as the one developed in the European Commission’s (DG ECFIN) 
“Ageing” model, which provides estimates for the EU15 aggregate. This type of 
model, including several cohorts, is part of the family of “overlapping generations 
models” which have been made popular by the work of Auerbach and Kotlikoff. It 
allows one to simulate the impact of ageing, taking due account of various economic 
interactions, often neglected by partial equilibrium approaches. It rests on an 
analytical framework which combines standard growth regressions with recent 
developments in endogenous growth theory. A general equilibrium approach is 
generally regarded as the most complex but comprehensive methodology for 
predicting the long run effects of ageing populations since it overcomes a number of 
the key limitations of static, partial equilibrium, analyses. The latter fail to take into 
account the effect of important systemic, dynamic, forces that will undoubtedly kick 
into action once ageing starts to impact on the economic system.  
 
DG ECFIN has already produced a global growth scenario up to 2050 using such an 
approach, where the worldwide economic and financial market effects of ageing 
populations over the next 50 years are presented on the basis of a five region, 
overlapping generations, model14. DG ECFIN regards this global ageing scenario as 
the benchmark against which the estimates produced within the framework of the 
EPC-AWG budgetary projection exercise (and presented in this paper) should be 
compared. 
 
                                                 
13 OECD (2003). See also Bassanini et al.(2001). 
14 See Mc Morrow and Röger (2004). 
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 However, one of the drawbacks of the general equilibrium approach is that the 
estimates produced are often too complex to be carried out for each EU Member State 
in a comparable manner. The effect of each determinant might not be the same across 
countries and consequently they might require a specific projection for each 
contributory factor. Moreover, the cross-country comparability cannot fully be 
guaranteed given the large number of parameters used and assumptions required.  
 
3.3. 
                                                
The merit of a “hybrid” approach: a “statistical” method embedded in a 
production function framework 
This third approach, and the one adopted for the present paper, is to calculate 
potential output using a combination of reasonable ad hoc assumptions for the long 
run and established time series methods to extrapolate short-term developments. In 
this approach, ageing is mainly taken into account to the extent that it is already 
influencing developments in the labour force (projected through a cohort method 
approach)15.  
 
Although this approach does not model nor take into account all relevant age-related 
factors, it is a clear improvement compared with the purely mechanical approach 
consisting in setting a common convergence target in labour productivity at the end of 
the projection horizon. The approach based on a production function is fairly standard 
in mainstream macro-models and is often used to make short-term (2-3 years) 
forecasts of productivity by international institutions16 (OECD, ECB, IMF, EC, etc). 
This methodology provides a sound economic basis and takes into account the 
interactions of labour force and employment projections on medium run productivity 
trends. An additional advantage is that it takes into account the slow convergence to 
the steady state from the initial conditions. This makes the projections in the short and 
medium run much more realistic (because of the “Keynesian” dynamics and the 
impact of capital or labour deepening). However, in the longer run (say 10-20 years), 
the model should converge to the neoclassical equilibrium conditions.  
 
Moreover, while clearly less comprehensive from an economic standpoint compared 
with the general equilibrium method, the statistical approach has nevertheless 
advantages in terms of conceptual simplicity; in terms of its greater flexibility in 
taking more country-specific factors into account; and finally in its ability to focus on 
the medium term effect of the demographic slowdown on productivity. For all these 
reasons, this statistical method based on a production function framework was chosen 
by the EPC-AWG to project labour productivity and GDP until 2050. In the rest of 
the paper we will present the methodology and the main results of the projections. 
 
 
15 For details on the methodology used and of the major results from the labour force projections see Carone 
(2005). 
16 Institutions such as the OECD, ECB and IMF used such a framework in their model. Moreover, medium-term 
projections of productivity (say with a time horizon of 5 or 10 years) are based on the idea that the gap between 
actual and potential output gradually declines to zero. This comes down to assuming that after some time, actual 
labour productivity growth equals potential labour productivity, which is the ratio of potential output to potential 
employment. For instance, on the basis of the production function used to build the long-run supply-side 
conditions of the OECD’s INTERLINK models, Downes et al. (2003) have developed a medium-term reference 
scenario. It relies on the assumption that beyond the short-term projection horizon, gaps between actual output and 
potential output (with trend TFP and the unemployment rate at the medium-term NAIRU) are eliminated by 2009 
in all OECD countries.  
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 4. OVERVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY ADOPTED FOR THE PRESENT 
PROJECTIONS 
 
The “statistical / production function (PF)” approach was the preferred option of the 
EPC-AWG given its flexibility and sound analytical basis, especially in terms of 
understanding the main components driving labour productivity developments. The 
production function framework is presented in section 4.1. The adoption of the 
production function framework requires the making of some specific assumptions 
regarding developments in specific labour productivity components, namely TFP and 
capital deepening in the medium run (section 4.2) and in the long-run (section 4.3).  
 
4.1. The production function (PF) framework 
As shown in graph 1, within the analytical framework of a (Cobb Douglas) 
production function, potential GDP can be represented by a combination of factor 
inputs, multiplied with the technological level or total factor productivity (TFP). The 
parameters of the production function essentially determine the output elasticities to 
the individual inputs.  
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 Total output can be expressed more formally using a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with constant returns to scale:   
( ) βββ
β
βββ −−− =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛== 11
1
1 K.L.EK.L.TFPK.L.TFPY   (2.1) 
where:  
 
L is the supply of labour, i.e. total employment (in number of persons employed if 
there is no change in hours worked per person);  
 
K is the stock of capital; 
 
E is the labour-augmenting technical progress (i.e. Harrod-neutral technical progress);  
 
E.L is then interpretable as total employment in efficiency units. TFP and labour-
augmenting technical progress are linked with a simple relationship: ; β)E(TFP =
 
β is the labour share, i.e. the share of labour costs in total value-added. It’s value in 
the projection exercise is set at 0.65.17
 
However, as all these variables can be influenced by the business cycle in the short 
term, it is safer to project potential output, i.e. the output adjusted for cyclical 
movements in the economy. This requires estimating the trend components for the 
individual production factors, except for the capital stock, which can only adjust in 
the long run. Estimating potential output therefore amounts to removing the cyclical 
component from both TFP and labour input. Trend TFP is modelled as the HP 
Filtered Solow Residual. Potential employment is the total employment obtained 
when the unemployment rate equals the structural unemployment rate (NAIRU). It 
equals LF*(1-NAIRU), where LF stands for the total labour force. Therefore, if we 
assume a stable NAIRU in the medium/long term as predicted, potential employment 
growth coincides with labour force growth. The potential output denoted Yp can be 
expressed in logarithms as the sum (in logarithms) of trend TFP18, potential 
employment weighted by the labour share in total value-added and the total capital 
stock multiplied by 1 minus the labour share. More formally, we get:  
 
Log(Yp)=Log(trendTFP)+βLog(LF*(1-Nairu))+(1-β)logK (2.2) 
 
As a result, potential labour productivity growth comes down to the following 
expression (where Y, L, E and TFP denote here “potential” output, potential 
employment, trend labour-augmenting technical progress and trend TFP): 
                                                 
17 Although there was some debate about the possibility of a further decline in the labour share, most economists 
assume that it should remain broadly constant in the long run. The EPC-AWG agreed to assume that real wages 
will grow in line with labour productivity and, thus, the wage share will be constant over the projection period. 
This simple rule is uniformly applied to all Member States in order to allow for consistent cross-country 
comparisons of the results. The assumption is also well-founded in economic theory. If the real wage is equal to 
the marginal productivity of labour it follows that under the standard features of the production function, real wage 
growth is equal to labour productivity growth and real unit labour costs remain constant.  
18  It is expressed in terms of labour-augmenting efficiency (Eβ) for the OECD and the IMF. In the IMF’s model 
(Multimod), the production function for each country is specified as a Cobb-Douglas relationship between output 
and two factor inputs –the labour force and the real net capital stock – with a constant and an exogenous growth 
rate of total factor productivity. 
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Thus, the projection of TFP growth and the growth in capital per worker, so called 
capital deepening, are the key drivers of projected labour productivity over the 
medium run. 
 
In the long-run, according to the neo-classical growth model (Solow model), the 
economy should reach its equilibrium (also called steady state or balanced growth 
path), where both the ratio of the capital stock to labour expressed in efficiency units, 
K/(L.E) and output to labour expressed in efficiency units (or output per effective 
worker), remain constant over time. As a result, both the capital stock per worker and 
productivity per worker grow at the same pace as labour augmenting technical 
progress E. Therefore, the growth rate of both coincides with TFP growth divided by 
the labour share β: 
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 (2.4) 
It should also be noted that, in the steady state, the contribution of capital deepening 
to output growth is a simple function of TFP19, which becomes the single driver of 
labour productivity20.  
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  (2.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 As the labour share β is set equal to 0.65, the long-run contribution of capital deepening to labour productivity 
growth is 0.54 times TFP growth rate and, under the assumption of a long-run TFP growth equivalent to 1.1% (see 
section 4.3), this implies a long-run contribution of capital deepening to labour productivity growth equal to 0.6%. 
20 This, in turn, implies that in the long run the growth rate of the capital stock is set equal to the sum of the 
growth rate of employment and labour augmenting technical progress (the so-called “capital rule”). 
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BOX 1- Further possible refinements of the production function 
In this paper, we will use a simple form of the production function. However, we can refine its 
specification to take into account various factors which are not modelled in the baseline but are tackled 
in the sensitivity tests at the end of the paper.  
The key formula (2.3) can be augmented so as to separate out the effect of average annual hours 
worked per person denoted h and the enhancement in capital human HC (e.g. the relative productivity 
across age groups). If we denote N the number of persons employed and L the total labour input (skill-
adjusted hours worked in the economy), we obtain the following relationship:  
        L= h.HC.N        (2.6) 
Using (2.6), we can rewrite (2.3) in the following way: 
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Therefore, labour productivity growth as measured by the growth in GDP per worker is the weighted 
sum of the increase in TFP, the stock of physical capital per worker, a human capital indicator and 
average annual hours worked per worker. The effect of sectoral reallocations can be incorporated in the 
impact on TFP growth and the accumulation of capital. 
 
However, in the long run, according to the Solow neoclassical model, output per effective worker (or 
skill-augmented hourly labour productivity growth) and capital per effective worker are constant. This 
implies that labour productivity growth should equal the growth in TFP (divided by the share of labour 
in output) in the steady state, when the stock of capital adjusts.. In other words, we get in the long run: 
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This means that productivity growth measured as GDP growth per person employed coincides with 
total factor productivity weighted by the labour share β in total value added, if there is no change in 
human capital and hours worked per person. 
 
4.2. 
                                                
Short-to-medium term projections (2005-2009): underlying assumptions 
For the short-to-medium term the EPC-AWG decided to use the same approach as 
that used to estimate potential output and thus the output gap. These estimates are 
used in the assessment of the cyclical budgetary position of Member States, within 
the surveillance framework of the Stability and Growth pact (SGP)21. The statistical 
approach used by DG ECFIN and the Output Gap Working Group (OGWG) is 
applied to historical (starting in the mid-1960’s) and forecast data. For the historical 
period the series at hand are taken from DG ECFIN’s AMECO databank, with the 
Commission services final Spring 2005 forecasts for the years 2005-2006 being used. 
A “Medium Term Extension” model is used to cover a period of 3 years from the end 
of the short-term forecasts i.e. in this case to run estimates from 2007-2009. It is 
important to stress that this technical extension is in no way a forecast for these years. 
It is simply an attempt to illustrate what would happen if the trends of the most recent 
years were to continue on, using established and transparent ARIMA procedures. The 
 
21 These estimates are carried out by DG ECFIN under the supervision of the Output Gap Working Group 
(OGWG), attached to the Economic Policy Committee. For further details, see Denis et al. (2002). 
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 potential growth rates for the three extension years are calculated using the standard 
key inputs, calculated using the methodology presented below. 
 
4.2.1. Trend Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
Trend TFP is modelled as the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered Solow Residual. TFP is 
calculated until the end of the short term forecast horizon, using the forecasts for 
GDP, employment and the capital stock. For the medium term extension, a TFP 
forecast is generated with a simple autoregressive model, where the log of current 
TFP is explained by a constant, a time trend and lagged values of TFP. Lags up to 
three years are allowed such as to render the residual white noise. This is the simplest 
time series representation and is likely to provide smooth projections. The HP trend is 
then calculated on the whole series. 
 
4.2.2. Kalman filter generated NAIRU   
The trend specification chosen for the NAIRU implies that the best prediction for the 
change in the NAIRU in future periods is the current estimate of the intercept. This 
basically implies that the slope of the NAIRU in 2006 should be used for the 
projection until 2009. Such a specification seems problematic for longer-term 
projections since it will eventually violate economic constraints (such as non-
negativity of the NAIRU, for example). An alternative specification which is more 
consistent with the common notion of the NAIRU as a stable long run level of the 
unemployment rate would be a random walk without drift. This specification would 
imply a flat extrapolation of the last NAIRU value. Though this specification does not 
work well in estimation for European data where persistent trend changes of the 
unemployment rate can be observed, it may be a more plausible specification for the 
projections. The final methodology for the medium term NAIRU agreed by the 
OGWG represents a compromise between the preceding two concepts. It was decided 
that the NAIRU would be projected according to the following simple rule: 
)(*5. 11 −+ −+= tttt NAIRUNAIRUNAIRUNAIRU  
In forecasting the NAIRU, while taking into account possible lagged effects of recent 
reforms, 50% of the most recent decline is allowed for. This implies that the NAIRU 
is practically stable in 2009, because after 3 years the change in the NAIRU only 
amounts to 12.5% of the decline in 2006. 
4.2.3. Population of working age  
In terms of a projection for the population of working age for the three years 2007-
2009, Eurostat’s most recent population projections are used. 
4.2.4. Participation rates   
 
A “cohort component” approach is used to project participation rates by different age 
groups and gender on a single year basis22. In essence, this cohort methodology has 
the following features:   
                                                 
22 We use the results provided by Carone (2005) within the same framework of the EPC-AWG projections. 
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• Entry and exit rates calculated, by single age and sex, as an average over the 
period 1997-2003. 
 
• Entry rates are assumed to be constant throughout the whole forecasting 
period with no projected decline in participation rates in the age brackets 15-
20. 
 
• Adjustments to exit rates for persons aged 55 to 64 are made to take into 
account the effects of recent pension reforms in 18 countries. 
 
Moreover, for several Member States (in particular Germany, Belgium and 
Luxembourg) labour force (and unemployment) figures projected using the labour 
force survey have been converted into national accounts or administrative data 
equivalents23.  
4.2.5. Capital formation: fixed investment-to-GDP ratio  
 
Since the purpose of the short-run exercise is to get an estimate for potential output 
up to 2009, the investment to potential GDP series is used as an exogenous variable. 
Its projection for the period 2007-2009 is based on an autoregressive (AR) process 
allowing for a constant and a time trend estimated until 2006. Notice, this makes 
investment endogenous. For a constant investment to GDP ratio, investment responds 
to potential output with an elasticity equal to one. Simple investment projections are 
consistent with the efficient use of physical capital (see  BOX 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 For details on these transformations of the labour input figures see European Commission (2005). 
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 BOX 2- Consistency of the investment rule with the efficiency condition for capital  
 
Cost minimisation requires that firms equate the marginal product of capital to capital costs. 
Intuitively, this efficiency condition for capital can be derived as follows. An investor in period t has 
the option of either investing in physical capital or nominal bonds. A unit of physical capital with price 
tP  invested in period t yields a nominal return equal to 
NMPK  plus the price that can be charged for 
the used capital good in period t+1. Denote this value by 1)1( +− tPδ , where δ  is the rate of 
depreciation. Alternatively, investment in nominal bonds yields a return equal to , where  tt Pi )1( + ti
is the nominal interest rate. Arbitrage implies that both strategies should yield the same return  
 
(1a) . 1)1()1( +−+=+ tNttt PMPKPi δ
 
In real terms this can be written as 
 
(1b)  )( 1 δπ +−= +ttRt iMPK
 
where 1+tπ  is  expected inflation. Because of adjustment rigidities for capital the efficiency condition 
(1b) does not hold in each period exactly but should be approximately fulfilled over the medium term. 
Longer term deviations in both directions would signal inefficiencies. If  RMPK  is consistently 
larger than the required return, then investors obviously do not exploit profit opportunities from real 
investment. If RMPK  is below the required return this would represent a clear case of 
overinvestment24.  For a Cobb Douglas production function as assumed here, the marginal product of 
capital is proportional to capital productivity, where the scaling factor is the output elasticity of capital 
(1- β ) which under constant returns to scale is equal to one minus the wage share 
 
(2) 
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Substituting the right hand side of equation (1b) in the left hand side of equation (2) and making the 
suitable arrangements, we get the following expression: 
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Expressing (3) in terms of investment rate (i.e. ratio of investment to potential output) gives: 
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Assuming that the real interest rate, the rate of depreciation and the labour share are constant, at least 
in the medium-run and that potential output growth remains broadly unchanged in the medium-run 
(which is of course not true in the longer run), we can infer the investment rate is broadly constant in 
the medium run: the variation in the capital stick is a linear function of potential output in level. 
Therefore the projections for investment in the medium run based on the investment rule are consistent 
with the theory and, more precisely, the efficiency condition for capital. As the assumption of constant 
potential output growth is not valid in the long run anymore, we apply from 2010 to 2030 a transition 
rule to the steady-state, where capital stock growth strictly equals output growth ("capital rule"). The 
latter is fully consistent with the efficiency condition of capital, in particular with equation (3), written 
in terms of growth rate. 
                                                 
24 Only for Sweden and Finland do we notice an increase in the marginal productivity of capital (MPK) over the 
next 50 years, using our standard projection for the investment rate. For these two countries the investment rate 
was therefore calculated such that the MPK remains constant over the next five decades.  
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 4.3. Long run projections (2010-2050) : underlying assumptions 
Three principles have been borne in mind when carrying out long term projections : 
• Firstly, the need to ensure consistency between the medium term projection 
based on country-specific trends and the long-run projection based on 
convergence rules toward the same value of labour productivity at the end of 
the projection horizon. There is also an overriding constraint to ensure 
comparability across the EU through the use of a common methodology for 
all Member States. 
 
• Secondly, as the cross-country comparability of results entails similar 
assumptions of productivity at the end of the projection, a key issue is whether 
this convergence should be achieved in growth rates or levels. While 
economic theory shows that real convergence is conditional upon crucial 
parameters such as the savings rate and demographic developments, the 
empirical literature does not support the idea of absolute convergence in levels 
between countries. So, we will assume convergence in growth rates in the 
present projection exercise. However, the level matters through its influence 
on the convergence speed and on the need for special TFP growth rate 
adjustments in a number of countries which have initially relatively low TFP 
levels (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and all EU10 countries). 
  
• Thirdly, there are large differences of opinion regarding the need for strict 
convergence to the same growth rate of labour productivity by 2030 across 
countries, including the newly acceded Member States. On the one hand, it 
can be argued that a convergence rule is important to ensure comparability of 
the age-related pension expenditure calculations. On the other hand, it is 
reasonable to assume ongoing differences after 2030, with these differences 
reflecting the different starting levels and growth rates of respective countries; 
different assumptions on convergence in growth rates; and finally the huge 
diversity in the EU25. As a compromise, the EPC-AWG agreed that the TFP 
projections could converge quickly to the same growth rate in order to take 
account of those EU15 countries which had very low or very high TFP growth 
rates at the start of the projection exercise. For the EU10 Member States, 
whilst accepting that it would be wrong to treat them as a homogeneous 
group, concerns were nevertheless expressed that the differences across 
countries were too great and persisting for too long a period. In addition, the 
capital deepening assumption for these countries could be adjusted to allow 
for greater convergence.  
 
4.3.1.  Total Factor Productivity  
The assumption on TFP is crucial since in the long run (2010-2050), labour 
productivity growth (output per person employed) broadly coincides with TFP 
growth (divided by the share of labour in output). Different options were possible. 
The EPC-AWG agreed that a prudent assumption for TFP would be that country-
specific TFP growth would converge by 2030-2050 to the past TFP growth rate 
recorded for the EU as a whole over a long period (1970-2004), i.e. 1.1% per annum, 
with the speed of the convergence process perhaps dictated by the size of the initial 
gap in TFP levels. According to DG ECFIN’s AMECO database, this average rate is 
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 almost identical to that experienced in the leading economy in the world, i.e. the US, 
in the very long run (since the 1960s). However it is slightly lower than that seen in 
the US more recently (around 1.2% since 1990 compared with 0.8% in the EU15). In 
effect, it is safer to base longer term TFP projections on long-term past trends rather 
than on the most recent developments which are more likely to be influenced by 
special factors (such as the ICT boom in the 1990s). The other possible options, 
shown in Table 4, were considered more arbitrary.  
 
Table 4 : Some other options for the long-term TFP growth rate assumption 
Options Economic implications 
Using deterministic country trend model specification 
for TFP level (AR process + time trend) 
The long run trend TFP reverts to the average trend estimated for 
each country over the considered historical period (say 1973-2003 
or 1995-2005) 
Using stochastic trend model specification for TFP level 
(unobserved component). 
Trend TFP is heavily influenced by recent TFP growth rates 
recorded by each country.  
Using the past trend (AR or HP-filtered) TFP growth for 
the EU as a whole. 
This supposes a fast convergence of productivity levels in Europe, 
which is completed in 2008. 
Convergence towards the US growth rate (an 
“optimistic” and illustrative scenario where all 15 EU 
countries converge to the US TFP growth rate, with the 
speed of the convergence process dictated by the size of 
the initial gap in TFP levels.) 
This supposes that the TFP gap with the US should close rapidly, 
with the current contribution of TFP growth for the EU (around 
0.8-0.9 percentage points) rising up to around 1.2 percentage 
points. 
 
Therefore the assumptions are as follows : 
• TFP growth rates will converge to 1.1% by 2030 for all EU15 Member States, 
with different speeds of convergence for individual Member States depending 
on the gap in TFP levels; 
 
• for the EU10 Member States, TFP will converge to 1.75% by 2030 and, at the 
same pace, to 1.1% in 2050. In order to allow for a faster convergence both 
across the EU10 and between the EU15 and the EU10, three quarters of the 
convergence towards 1.75% and subsequently to 1.1% is achieved in 2015 
and 2035 respectively; 
 
• as the TFP level as a percentage of the EU15 average appears too low at the 
end of the projection period, some ad-hoc adjustments have been made for 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain (see BOX 3). These adjustments aim at avoiding 
any strong divergence in productivity levels in the cohesion countries, which 
are often considered to belong to the “convergence club”, as opposed to the 
“frontier club”. For Italy, the slightly faster convergence in growth rates takes 
into account the fact that recent (unfavourable) productivity trends may partly 
reflect special circumstances (i.e. the short-term adverse effects of labour 
market reforms and of dynamic employment growth on productivity) and 
should not be extrapolated for too long a time period. 
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 These assumptions suggest that the projection relies on some degree of arbitrariness, 
which illustrates the uncertainty surrounding all long term projections. Moreover, for 
the sake of simplicity, the assumptions are not taking into account some specific 
effects of ageing populations, as TFP is supposed to be exogenous. In particular, 
while rising levels of participation, which is likely to benefit the less skilled workers 
or those without work experience, may depress TFP, the projected rise in educational 
attainment can be expected to enhance TFP growth. Likewise, the change in the age 
structure of the working population may weigh down on TFP given the age profile of 
productivity (for this issue see sensitivity tests in section 6). Nonetheless, available 
studies suggest that older workers are not systematically less productive than younger 
ones, the main factor being the level of education. Some also argue that older workers 
may be more inflexible and more reluctant to innovate and to embrace technological 
changes. Given the great deal of uncertainty attached to this issue, it has not been 
included in the productivity projections. On balance, the assumptions for TFP remain 
reasonable and are meant to avoid strong divergences in TFP levels. 
 
 
BOX 3 - Country specific adjustments  
 
These adjustments were made to take into account the specifc situation of the cohesion countries, 
which might require some additional convergence in levels, and to tackle a number of country 
specific issues in the “old” Member States. These adjustments have been made following the 
advice provided by the national delegates of the concerned countries in the EPC’s Ageing 
Working Group.  
 
Greece. Three quarters of the TFP convergence process to 1.1% is achieved by 2015 (high 
convergence from a lower level than that of the steady state). Then TFP growth converges linearly 
to reach 1.1% in 2030.  
 
Portugal. TFP growth converges in 2013 towards 1.6% (i.e. 3/4 of the intermediate target for 
EU10) and stays at that level until 2026. Then TFP growth converges to 1.1% in 2030, like for the 
other EU15 countries. The projection of TFP allows for a fairly smooth convergence path to 1.6% 
and then to 1.1% by using reasonable transition periods (2010-2012 and 2027-2029) and a 
quadratic convergence pattern (rather than linear) so as to avoid implausible and excessively 
mechanistic dynamics. This ad hoc adjustment is motivated by the need to allow some real 
convergence in Portugal, given their low initial level of productivity and the strong catching-up 
dynamics in the EU10. However, as Portugal has been already in the EU15 since 1986, benefiting 
from a favourable economic environment for catching-up, its productivity convergence is 
projected to be significantly lower than in the EU10. The Portuguese delegation to the AWG also 
claims that such an adjustment is consistent with a closing of the human capital gap in Portugal 
and broadly corresponds to the estimated effect of increasing the average number of years of 
formal education in the same way as observed in Ireland, Italy, Spain and Greece in 1970-1998. It 
assumes that the human capital catch-up has been delayed and is expected to broadly have the 
same magnitude as that recorded by the other cohesion countries (plus Italy) in the past.  
 
Spain. The new GDP and employment National Accounts data released for Spain are used at the 
start of the projection period. Moreover, the TFP convergence to 1.1% is achieved by 2012 instead 
of 2030.  
 
Italy. TFP converges to 1.1% by 2015 instead of 2030.  This higher speed of convergence results 
in an average labour productivity growth rate for Italy over the period 2011-2050 of around 1.7%. 
This labour productivity growth rate is now similar to the average rates assumed for other large 
Euro area countries such as Germany and France. 
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 4.3.2.  Working age population25  
 
The population projection used to estimate GDP and labour productivity growth, is a 
variant of the Europop 2004 projections26, prepared by Eurostat. Compared to 
Europop 2004, the EPC-AWG-variant produced by Eurostat contains two major 
changes, introduced upon a request from national statistical offices and members of 
the EPC-AWG: 
 
• the first one is a convergence in life expectancy27 across the EU15 Member 
States; 28  
• the second change is in the number of (working age) migrants in Germany and 
Italy, which is higher because of specific adjustments made to the level and/or 
age structure of migrants compared to Europop 2004. For Spain, only the age 
structure of net migration was adjusted, not the net flows of migrants. Table 5 
shows the projections for life expectancy at birth and for the total population 
in both the Europop 2004 and the AWG variant scenario, as well as the 
difference between the two scenarios. Table 6 presents the net migration flows 
in the AWG variant scenario and the difference with the assumptions in 
Europop 2004 for Germany, Spain and Italy. 
The main results of the demographic projections are reported in Table 7. The size and 
age structure of the EU25 population is projected to undergo dramatic changes in the 
coming decades due to the dynamics of fertility, life expectancy and migration rates. 
The overall size of the population is projected to be both smaller and older than it is 
now. Under the baseline scenario, the EU25 population is projected to increase 
slightly, by 3% until 2025, when it will peak at 470 million. Thereafter, a steady 
decline occurs and, according to the projections, the population in 2050 will be 
smaller than in 2004, at 449 million.  
 
The working age population (15 to 64) is already declining in Germany, Italy, 
Hungary and Latvia. In many other countries the decline will start in 2010-2011 
(Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland and others). 
 
                                                 
25 For details on the methodology and results see Carone (2005). 
26 See Eurostat (2005). 
27 A convergence rule is defined whereby a convergence coefficient is applied to adjust the life expectancy levels 
in the EUROPOP 2004 projections and to narrow the deviation from the EU15 average. The convergence rule is 
defined as follows:  
For the EU15 countries (but not for the EU10 countries, where a convergence factor was already included in 
Europop 2004 ), the life expectancy e at age x for sex s in country c is forced towards the EU15 average emerging 
from the baseline of Europop 2004 by applying a convergence coefficient k varying along time t. The convergence 
coefficient increases linearly over time from k=0 in 2004 to k=0.5 in 2050, when the range of variation in life 
expectancy from the baseline of EUROPOP 2004 is halved.  
28 The Europop 2004 assumptions on life expectancy at birth already incorporate a convergence factor for the 
EU10 countries, and thus the AWG variant scenario does not cover the EU10 for which the original Europop 2004 
projections are used. 
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 Table 5: Comparison of Europop 2004 and the EPC-AWG variant population scenario : life expectancy and 
population 
Country
AWG EUROPOP Diff. AWG EUROPOP Diff. AWG EUROPOP Diff. AWG EUROPOP Diff.
Belgium 82,1 82,3 -0,2 87,5 88,3 -0,8 5,3 5,3 0,0 5,5 5,6 0,0
Denmark 81,4 80,9 0,5 85,2 83,7 1,5 2,7 2,7 0,0 2,8 2,7 0,0
Germany 82,0 82,0 0,0 86,8 86,8 0,0 38,0 36,7 1,3 39,7 38,0 1,8
Greece 81,1 80,3 0,8 85,9 85,1 0,8 5,3 5,3 0,0 5,4 5,4 0,1
Spain 81,7 81,4 0,3 87,3 87,9 -0,6 21,1 20,7 0,3 21,9 22,1 -0,2
France 82,3 82,7 -0,4 87,9 89,1 -1,2 31,9 32,1 -0,1 33,2 33,6 -0,4
Ireland 82,2 82,4 -0,2 86,8 87,0 -0,1 2,7 2,7 0,0 2,8 2,8 0,0
Italy 82,8 83,6 -0,8 87,8 88,8 -1,0 26,3 25,8 0,6 27,4 26,9 0,5
Luxembourg 81,8 81,6 0,2 86,7 86,7 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,0
Netherlands 81,1 80,2 0,9 85,2 83,6 1,6 8,7 8,7 0,1 8,9 8,8 0,1
Austria 82,8 83,6 -0,8 87,2 87,7 -0,5 4,0 4,0 0,0 4,2 4,2 0,0
Portugal 81,2 80,4 0,8 86,7 86,6 0,0 4,9 4,9 0,0 5,2 5,2 0,0
Finland 81,9 81,9 0,0 86,6 86,5 0,1 2,6 2,6 0,0 2,6 2,6 0,0
Sweden 82,6 83,3 -0,7 86,6 86,5 0,1 5,1 5,1 0,0 5,1 5,1 0,0
United Kingdom 82,4 82,9 -0,5 86,7 86,6 0,1 31,8 32,0 -0,1 32,4 32,4 0,0
Cypros 81,9 81,9 0,0 85,1 85,1 0,0 0,5 0,5 0,0 0,5 0,5 0,0
Czech Republic 79,7 79,7 0,0 84,1 84,1 0,0 4,4 4,4 0,0 4,5 4,5 0,0
Estonia 74,9 74,9 0,0 83,1 83,1 0,0 0,5 0,5 0,0 0,6 0,6 0,0
Hungary 78,1 78,1 0,0 83,4 83,4 0,0 4,3 4,3 0,0 4,6 4,6 0,0
Lithuania 75,5 75,5 0,0 83,7 83,7 0,0 1,4 1,4 0,0 1,5 1,5 0,0
Latvia 74,3 74,3 0,0 82,5 82,5 0,0 0,9 0,9 0,0 1,0 1,0 0,0
Malta 81,8 81,8 0,0 85,0 85,0 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,0
Poland 79,1 79,1 0,0 84,4 84,4 0,0 16,4 16,4 0,0 17,3 17,3 0,0
Slovak Republic 77,7 77,7 0,0 83,4 83,4 0,0 2,3 2,3 0,0 2,4 2,4 0,0
Slovenia 79,8 79,8 0,0 85,1 85,1 0,0 0,9 0,9 0,0 1,0 1,0 0,0
 FemalesMales  Females Males
Total population, in millionsLife expectancy at birth in 2050
Source: Eurostat, Commission services. 
Table 6: Projected net migration flows in AWG-variant population scenario  (‘000 persons, % of total 
population, simulated net inflows)  
ource: Eurostat, Commission services. 
cumulated
2004-2050
2004 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2004 2050 
Belgium 24 20 19 19 19 19 0.23 0.17 897
Denmark 8 7 7 7 7 7 0.15 0.12 323
Germany 270 230 215 205 200 200 0.33 0.26 10180
Greece 43 40 39 35 35 35 0.39 0.33 1743
Spain 508 112 110 105 104 102 1.22 0.24 6235
France 64 62 60 59 59 59 0.11 0.09 2823
Ireland 16 15 14 13 13 12 0.41 0.23 645
Italy 150 150 150 150 150 150 0.26 0.28 7050
Luxembourg 3 3 3 3 3 3 0.63 0.43 132
Netherlands 21 33 33 32 31 31 0.13 0.18 1480
Austria 25 24 21 19 20 20 0.31 0.25 985
Portugal 42 18 16 15 15 15 0.40 0.15 808
Finland 6 6 6 6 6 6 0.12 0.12 288
Sweden 28 24 23 22 22 21 0.31 0.21 1069
United Kingdom 139 116 103 99 99 98 0.23 0.15 4939
Cyprus 6 6 5 5 5 5 0.83 0.50 238
Czech Republic 4 3 10 22 21 20 0.04 0.22 647
Estonia 1 -2 0 2 2 2 0.06 0.15 19
Hungary 15 13 14 21 21 20 0.15 0.22 795
Lithuania -6 -6 -1 5 4 4 -0.16 0.15 28
Latvia -2 -3 -1 3 3 3 -0.09 0.15 30
Malta 3 2 2 2 2 3 0.64 0.50 113
Poland -28 -35 -11 36 35 34 -0.07 0.10 318
Slovak Republic -2 -2 1 5 5 5 -0.04 0.10 109
Slovenia 6 6 5 7 7 7 0.31 0.35 287
EU25 1464 783 789 835 830 822 0.32 0.18 39710
EU15 1467 801 765 727 724 721 0.38 0.19 37123
EU10 -3 -18 24 107 105 101 0.00 0.15 2586
Difference with  EUROPOP2004
in thousands Cumulated
2004-50
2004 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2004 2050
Germany 59.4 26.8 20.7 24.0 20.7 20.8 0.1 0.0 1199.6
Spain 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Italy -180.0 31.9 31.9 36.2 36.1 36.2 -0.3 0.1 6405.2
as a %
of total population
in thousands as a %
 of total population
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 Table 7 : Population projections : baseline scenario: peaks and troughs  
Total population
Country Peak year Value Trough year Value 
 
Source: Eurostat  Commission services. 
 
Absolute % Absolute %
Belgium 10356 2036 11012 2050 10849 656 6.3 -163 -1.5
Denmark 5384 2033 5607 2050 5493 223 4.1 -114 -2.0
Germany 82537 2020 83500 2050 77742 963 1.2 -5758 -6.9
Greece 11006 2020 11438 2050 10734 431 3.9 -704 -6.2
Spain 41551 2022 45634 2050 42977 4084 9.8 -2657 -5.8
France 59630 2040 65649 2050 65148 6019 10.1 -502 -0.8
Ireland 3964 2050 5475 1511 38.1
Italy 57321 2014 58592 2050 53762 1271 2.2 -4831 -8.2
Luxembourg 448 2050 643 195 43.4
Netherlands 16193 2038 17773 2050 17628 1581 9.8 -145 -0.8
Austria 8067 2029 8510 2050 8170 442 5.5 -340 -4.0
Portugal 10407 2019 10781 2050 10051 374 3.6 -730 -6.8
Finland 5206 2028 5446 2050 5218 240 4.6 -228 -4.2
Sweden 8941 2050 10181 1240 13.9
United Kingdom 59438 2039 64679 2050 64210 5241 8.8 -469 -0.7
Cyprus 715 2050 975 260 36.3
Czech Republic 10203 2004 10211 2050 8894 8 0.1 -1318 -12.9
Estonia 1356 2003 1356 2050 1126 0 0.0 -230 -17.0
Hungary 10142 2003 10142 2050 8915 0 0.0 -1227 -12.1
Lithuania 3463 2003 3463 2050 2881 0 0.0 -581 -16.8
Latvia 2331 2003 2331 2050 1873 0 0.0 -459 -19.7
Malta 397 2050 508 111 27.9
Poland 38219 2003 38219 2050 33665 0 0.0 -4553 -11.9
Slovak Republic 5379 2004 5380 2050 4738 1 0.0 -642 -11.9
Slovenia 1995 2014 2019 2050 1901 24 1.2 -118 -5.8
EU25 454649 2027 471553 2050 453755 16904 3.7 -17798 -3.8
EU15 380448 2029 400632 2050 388280 20183 5.3 -12351 -3.1
Eurozone 306686 2026 321057 2050 308397 14371 4.7 -12661 -3.9
EU10 74201 2003 74201 2050 65475 0 0.0 -8726 -11.8
Working-age Population  (15-64)
Country Peak year Value Trough year Value 
Absolute % Absolute %
Belgium 10356 2011 6988 2050 6286 -3368 -32.5 -702 -10.0
Denmark 5384 2008 3596 2044 3244 -1787 -33.2 -352 -9.8
Germany 82537 2003 55682 2050 44975 -26854 -32.5 -10707 -19.2
Greece 11006 2010 7557 2050 5877 -3450 -31.3 -1680 -22.2
Spain 41551 2010 30301 2050 22937 -11249 -27.1 -7365 -24.3
France 59630 2011 40068 2050 37440 -19562 -32.8 -2628 -6.6
Ireland 3964 2035 3311 2050 3166 -653 -16.5 -144 -4.4
Italy 57321 2004 38549 2050 29342 -18772 -32.7 -9208 -23.9
Luxembourg 448 2050 394 -54 -12.1
Netherlands 16193 2011 11238 2039 10428 -4954 -30.6 -811 -7.2
Austria 8067 2012 5607 2050 4698 -2460 -30.5 -909 -16.2
Portugal 10407 2008 7135 2050 5514 -3272 -31.4 -1622 -22.7
Finland 5206 2010 3526 2050 3015 -1680 -32.3 -511 -14.5
Sweden 8941 2050 6046 -2895 -32.4
United Kingdom 59438 2011 40491 2050 37763 -18947 -31.9 -2728 -6.7
Cyprus 715 2043 608 2050 590 -107 -14.9 -18 -2.9
Czech Republic 10203 2007 7252 2050 5023 -2951 -28.9 -2229 -30.7
Estonia 1356 2006 917 2050 670 -439 -32.3 -247 -26.9
Hungary 10142 2003 6949 2050 5182 -3193 -31.5 -1768 -25.4
Lithuania 3463 2006 2322 2050 1717 -1141 -32.9 -605 -26.1
Latvia 2331 2003 1589 2050 1108 -742 -31.8 -482 -30.3
Malta 397 2041 311 2050 309 -86 -21.7 -2 -0.8
Poland 38219 2011 27165 2050 19399 -11053 -28.9 -7767 -28.6
Slovak Republic 5379 2010 3887 2050 2741 -1492 -27.7 -1147 -29.5
Slovenia 1995 2011 1414 2050 1065 -581 -29.1 -349 -24.7
EU25 454649 2011 311039 2050 259102 -143610 -31.6 -51936 -16.7
EU15 380448 2011 259033 2050 221300 -121415 -31.9 -37733 -14.6
Eurozone 306686 2011 208974 2050 174219 -97713 -31.9 -34755 -16.6
EU10 74201 2009 52125 2050 37803 -22076 -29.8 -14322 -27.5
Starting year:2003
(value in thousands)
Difference: 
from  2003 to  peak 
Difference: 
from  peak to  trough 
Starting year:2003
(value in thousands)
Difference: 
from  2003 to  peak 
Difference: 
from  peak to  trough 
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In the EU25, the working age population is projected to record a sharp decline, down 
from 67.2% of the overall population to 57%, due to a reduction of more than 45 
million people of working age (from 305.2 million in 2003 to 259.1 million in 2050), 
a drop of around 15%. This is the result of a projected shrinking of the youth (aged 15 
to 24) and the prime-age population (aged 25 to 54), which is expected to decrease, 
starting from 2011 in the EU25. These trends will lead to a dramatic change in the 
ratio of people of working age to those in retirement. 
 
4.3.3. Participation rates 
The labour force projections taken as the basis for the EPC-AWG budgetary 
projection exercise are reproduced in Table 8. To summarise the outcome of the 
baseline scenario projection, the aggregate overall participation rates (for the age 
group 15 to 64) in the EU25 are projected to increase by about 6 percentage points 
over the period 2003 to 2050 (from 69.4% in 2003 to 74.6% in 2025 and to 75.2% in 
2050). 
Table 8 : Projected changes in participation rates, 2003-2050  
2003-2050 2003-2025 2025-2050 2003-2050 2003-2025 2025-2050
Belgium 5.0 4.3 0.8 2.8 2.0 0.8
Denmark 2.1 1.4 0.7 0.0 -1.0 1.0
Germany 6.4 6.1 0.3 3.8 4.0 -0.2
Greece 4.6 4.5 0.1 1.1 3.1 -2.1
Spain 9.2 8.0 1.2 4.0 6.3 -2.3
France 3.8 2.4 1.4 1.8 0.5 1.3
Ireland 8.4 7.4 1.0 3.9 5.4 -1.6
Italy 7.4 5.2 2.2 4.3 3.6 0.7
Luxembourg 3.4 2.8 0.5 1.8 1.0 0.7
Netherlands 4.0 2.6 1.4 1.6 -0.2 1.8
Austria 6.9 5.6 1.3 2.7 2.4 0.2
Portugal 5.0 4.4 0.5 1.8 3.3 -1.4
Finland 5.1 4.4 0.7 2.2 1.3 0.9
Sweden 3.6 3.3 0.3 2.0 1.5 0.5
United Kingdom 3.0 2.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 -0.3
Cyprus 9.9 10.9 -1.0 5.1 7.9 -2.8
Czech Republic 4.2 6.8 -2.6 -1.2 3.6 -4.8
Estonia 6.0 7.2 -1.2 3.2 5.6 -2.4
Hungary 5.9 8.0 -2.2 2.9 5.6 -2.7
Lithuania 7.1 9.0 -1.9 3.9 7.4 -3.4
Latvia 7.4 9.3 -1.9 4.6 7.8 -3.1
Malta 7.4 8.6 -1.2 3.4 5.2 -1.8
Poland 7.2 9.8 -2.5 1.4 5.6 -4.2
Slovak Republic 3.8 8.1 -4.3 -3.2 4.1 -7.2
Slovenia 6.1 6.7 -0.6 1.7 3.9 -2.2
EU25 5.9 5.3 0.6 2.7 3.2 -0.5
EU15 5.7 4.6 1.1 2.9 2.8 0.1
Eurozone 6.2 5.1 1.1 3.2 3.2 0.1
Nms10 6.4 8.9 -2.5 1.2 5.3 -4.1
Changes in participation rates ( age 15-64) Changes in participation rates ( age 15-71) 
  
 
Source:  Commission services-DG ECFIN. 
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 4.3.4. Moving from labour force to employment projections : assumptions on 
structural unemployment  
In order to move from labour force projections to employment projections, the EPC-
AWG agreed to use the NAIRU calculation as the best available proxy for a 
projection of a structural unemployment rate under a “no policy change” scenario. 
Although significant uncertainty remains around this assumption, it was agreed that, 
as a general rule, unemployment rates converge towards the 2009 European 
Commission-DG ECFIN estimates of the NAIRU’s for each country, and afterwards 
they are kept constant. The EPC-AWG considered this a reasonable assumption 
which also had the advantage of ensuring consistency with other budgetary 
surveillance procedures in the European Union. Indeed, these NAIRU estimates are 
already used for the calculation of the output gap, and widely discussed and agreed 
upon by Member States’ delegates in the EPC’s Output Gap Working Group 
(OGWG).  
 
As explained earlier, the 2009 NAIRU is calculated by projecting the latest estimates 
of the NAIRU (based on the Spring 2005 Commission services forecast) up to 2009 
according to the following simple rule: 
 
)(*5. 11 −+ −+= tttt NAIRUNAIRUNAIRUNAIRU  
 
Thus, in order to forecast the NAIRU and take into account possible lagged effects of 
recent reforms, 50% of the most recent decline in actual unemployment rates is 
attributed to a decline in the NAIRU.  
 
To avoid extrapolating forward high NAIRU levels for countries still above the EU15 
average (Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy and Finland), the EPC-AWG agreed 
a convergence to the 2009 EU15 average, over a period of 10 years. As regards the 
EU10 Member States which have relatively high unemployment rates (Poland and 
Slovakia), the EPC-AWG agreed a convergence towards the 2009 EU15 average 
NAIRU over a longer time horizon of 20 years. For the three EU10 Member States 
where the current unemployment rate is already below the proposed target (Cyprus, 
Hungary, Slovenia), it was agreed to keep the estimated trend unemployment rate in 
2004 constant (3.8% in Cyprus, 4.8% in Hungary and 6% in Slovenia), while for the 
remaining EU10 Member States the convergence towards the EU15 2009 average is 
completed in 10 years.  
 
The methodology agreed by the EPC-AWG to guarantee the convergence of the 
unemployment rate of some Member States towards the 2009 EU15 average by 2015 
had the effect of reducing the euro area average. As a result, those countries where 
unemployment rates were close to the EU15 average in 2003 (such as Belgium, Italy, 
and the Czech Republic) and below the euro area unemployment rate in 2003, were 
penalised in terms of their relative position within the euro area, ending up with a 
long-run unemployment rate higher than the euro area average. The EPC-AWG 
agreed to adopt a simple solution in the final calculations, i.e. to reduce by a further 
0.5% points the long-term unemployment rate in Belgium, Italy and the Czech 
Republic in order to stay in line with the long-term euro area average.  
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 Table 9 shows the results of the projection, carried out following the agreed approach. 
Overall, a reduction in the unemployment rate of around 3 percentage points is 
projected for the EU25 (from 9.2% in 2005 to 6.2% in 2025) and a bit lower for the 
EU15 (2 percentage points, from 8% to 6%). This difference is due to the agreed path 
of convergence for Poland and Slovakia, which implies a substantial reduction in 
their unemployment rates (12.7 percentage points and 10.3 percentage points 
respectively) over the period 2004-2025. 
 
Table 9 : Unemployment rate assumptions (age 15-64) (in %) 
Change
Country 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2050 2003-2025
Belgium 8,2 7,7 7,0 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 -1,7
Denmark 5,5 4,9 4,3 4,3 4,3 4,3 4,3 4,3 -1,2
Germany 9,9 9,4 8,5 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 -2,9
Greece 9,8 9,3 8,6 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 -2,8
Spain 11,6 10,4 8,7 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 -4,6
France 9,0 9,1 8,3 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 -2,0
Ireland 4,8 4,0 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 -1,4
Italy 8,9 8,2 7,3 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 -2,4
Luxembourg 3,7 4,0 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 0,6
Netherlands 3,7 3,5 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2 -0,5
Austria 4,3 3,9 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 -0,9
Portugal 6,7 6,0 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,6 -1,1
Finland 9,2 8,0 6,8 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 -2,7
Sweden 5,7 5,0 4,3 4,3 4,3 4,3 4,3 4,3 -1,4
United Kingdom 5,1 4,8 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 -0,5
Cypros 4,4 4,0 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 -0,2
Czech Republic 7,9 7,8 7,3 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 -1,4
Estonia 10,3 9,1 7,8 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 -3,3
Hungary 5,9 5,3 4,8 4,8 4,8 4,8 4,8 4,8 -1,2
Lithuania 12,5 11,2 8,9 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 -5,5
Latvia 10,7 9,1 7,6 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 -3,7
Malta 7,6 8,5 8,3 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 -0,6
Poland 20,1 18,7 15,8 12,9 9,9 7,0 7,0 7,0 -13,1
Slovak Republic 17,6 16,7 15,2 12,5 9,7 7,0 7,0 7,0 -10,6
Slovenia 6,8 6,0 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,5 -1,2
EU25 9,3 8,7 7,8 6,7 6,4 6,1 6,1 6,1 -3,1
EU15 8,2 7,7 7,0 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,0 -2,2
Eurozone 9,0 8,5 7,6 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,4 -2,5
EU10 14,8 13,8 12,0 10,0 8,3 6,6 6,6 6,6 -8,3  
Source:  Commission services-DG ECFIN. 
 
4.3.5. Capital formation : transition to the steady state  
In the medium run (up to 2009), the capital stock is derived from the ratio of 
investment to GDP (i.e. the “investment rule”). As the latter is extrapolated from 
historical values using time-series techniques, it turns out broadly constant up to 
2009. This scenario works very well for the EU15 countries but leads to excessively 
optimistic investment performances for a number of the EU10 Member States since it 
extrapolates forward very high investment rates which are associated with the 
structural transition process. Moreover, this rule is fine provided that the user cost of 
capital remains stable, which should not be the case with declining economic growth 
rates associated with ageing. Indeed, movements in interest rates are supposed to 
broadly follow developments in potential output in the long run, as indicated in the 
golden rule of the Solow or Ramsey models.  
Therefore, one might impose that, in the long-run, the capital stock adjusts to the 
steady state path. The so-called “Capital Rule” provides that the growth rate of the 
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 capital stock is set equal to the sum of the growth rate of employment and labour 
augmenting technical progress. As seen in section 4.1, this fulfils the steady state 
property, as the ratio of capital stock to labour expressed in efficiency units remains 
constant over time. Consequently the labour productivity growth rate coincides with 
that of labour-augmenting technical progress. 
Nevertheless, this scenario results in very sharp shifts in investment rates for a large 
number of countries in the year in which the rule is introduced. When this rule is 
directly introduced from 2010 onwards, the investment rate is unacceptably large for 
a substantial number of countries (even if the breaks in the investment series become 
smaller over time as one moves to the balanced growth path). In addition, the 
introduction of the rule in 2010 results in relatively pessimistic productivity 
projections for a large number of the catching up countries whilst making little 
difference for those countries which are already close to their long run TFP growth 
rates.  
Therefore, a transition between the investment rule and the capital rule should be 
worked out to smoothen the profile of investment. The following pattern for capital 
formation has been used: 
(i) the capital stock dynamics is derived from the investment/GDP ratio until 2009, 
which is kept broadly constant (“investment rule”); 
(ii) the transition to the constant capital/labour ratio assumption is introduced 
gradually over the period 2010-2030 in a linear manner (“transition rule”); 
(iii) the capital/labour ratio (in efficiency units) is constant from 2030 to 2050 
(“capital rule”).  
5. MAIN RESULTS OF BASELINE PROJECTIONS  
 
5.1. Results for EU25, Euro Area, EU15 and EU10 
Table 10 presents the outcome of the projections for potential growth rates up to 2050 
as well as its determinants. For the EU25, the annual average potential GDP growth 
rate of 2.4% in the period 2004 to 2010 is projected to decline sharply, down to 1.5% 
in the period 2021-30 and to stabilise at 1.2% in the period 2031-2050. The projected 
fall in potential growth rates is much higher in the EU10 (3.6 percentage points) than 
in the EU15 (about 1 percentage point). For the EU10, the potential growth rate of 
4.2% between 2004 and 2010 is projected to fall to only 0.6% between 2041 and 
2050, lower than the projected growth rate of 1.3% for the EU15 at the end of the 
projection period. Over the whole period 2004-2050, output growth rates remain 
much higher in the EU10 than in the EU15, reflecting the strong expected economic 
catch-up in the EU10 Member States. However, GDP growth rates in the EU25 are 
very close to those in the EU15, as the latter represents more than 90% of the EU25 
total output at the start of the projection period.  
 
Tables 11 and 12 indicate the contribution of productivity per person employed and 
employment to projected potential growth rates. The much stronger decline in 
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 potential growth rates in the EU10 occurs especially because of less favourable 
demographic projections. Moreover, the productivity growth rates of the EU10 and of 
the EU15 Member states are assumed to converge to the rate of 1.7% at the very end 
of the projection horizon. This means that, compared with the period 2004-2010, 
labour productivity growth should slightly increase in the EU15 and sharply fall in 
the EU10 from a quite high starting level of 3.5%. 
 
Table 13 and 14 show the contribution of the main determinants of productivity per 
person employed, i.e. TFP growth and capital deepening. TFP growth explains most 
of the productivity growth per person employed. This is all the more so since, in the 
long-run, the capital deepening contribution follows TFP growth (times the labour 
share). By construction, TFP growth converges towards the rate of 1.1% at the end of 
the projection for all Member States, which, given the use of the “capital rule”, 
implies a labour productivity growth rate of 1.7% for all countries in the steady state 
(reached in 2030 for the EU25 and in 2050 for the EU10).  
 
While the capital deepening profile is in line with that of TFP growth from 2030, the 
capital dynamics in the period 2004-30 is more complex and worth describing further. 
In the EU15, the contribution of capital deepening rises from 0.4 p.p. in 2004-2010 to 
0.7 p.p. in 2011-2030, mirroring the positive impact of the demographic slowdown on 
the capital/labour ratio. Then, the capital deepening contribution takes its “steady 
state” value of 0.6 p.p. in the period 2030-2050. For the EU10, the capital deepening 
contribution is initially very high (around 1.6 p.p. between 2004 and 2020), consistent 
with the caching-up process of converging economies and the strong slowdown in 
employment growth. Then, the contribution gradually declines to the steady state 
value of 0.6 p.p., as the growth in the capital stock slowly adjusts to employment 
growth. Overall, the contribution of capital deepening in the EU10 is almost double 
that in the EU15 on average over the whole period 2004 to 2050.  
 
Table 15 presents the projections for GDP per capita growth rates. As expected, the 
projected decline in output per capita growth rates in both the EU15 and the EU10 is 
smaller than the projected fall in output growth rates, since total population growth 
rates are also projected to drop over the period 2004-2050.  
 
As a consequence of faster growth in GDP per capita in the EU10 than in the EU15 
and despite the very severe population ageing in the EU10, the level of income per 
capita in the EU10 is projected to increase from 50% of the EU15 average in 2004 to 
78% in 2050 (see Table 16). As indicated in Table 17, these developments result from 
the strong rise in projected EU10 productivity levels relative to the EU15, which 
reach 83% in 2050.  
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 Table 10 : Projected potential growth rates (based on underlying assumptions to be used in baseline EPC 
projection exercise (annual average growth) 
2004-2010 2011-2020 2021-2030 2031-2040 2041-2050 2004-2050
BE 2.4 2.1 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7
DK 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.7
DE 1.7 1.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
GR 2.9 2.0 1.2 0.8 0.8 1.5
ES 3.0 2.5 1.5 0.6 0.6 1.6
FR 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.8
IE 5.5 4.1 2.6 1.8 1.4 2.9
IT 1.9 1.8 1.2 0.8 1.1 1.3
LU 4.0 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1
NL 1.7 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.7
AT 2.2 2.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5
PT 1.9 2.4 1.9 0.8 0.8 1.5
FI 2.7 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.8
SE 2.7 2.7 2.1 1.8 1.9 2.2
UK 2.8 2.5 1.7 1.5 1.5 2.0
CY 4.3 4.1 2.9 2.3 1.5 2.9
CZ 3.5 2.9 2.2 1.0 0.7 2.0
EE 6.1 3.7 2.4 1.6 0.8 2.7
HU 3.7 2.8 2.3 1.2 1.0 2.1
LT 6.5 4.3 2.3 1.4 0.9 2.8
LV 7.7 4.4 2.4 1.5 0.7 3.1
MT 2.2 2.7 2.9 2.2 1.7 2.4
PL 4.6 3.8 2.7 1.2 0.5 2.4
SK 4.6 4.2 2.6 0.9 0.3 2.4
SI 3.7 2.8 2.1 1.3 1.0 2.1
EU25 2.4 2.2 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.7
EU15 2.2 2.1 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.6
EU12 2.1 2.0 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.5
EU10 4.7 3.5 2.5 1.2 0.6 2.4  
 
Table 11: Determinants of potential growth rates : labour productivity (annual average growth rates)             
2004-2010 2011-2020 2021-2030 2031-2040 2041-2050 2004-2050
BE 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7
DK 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8
DE 0.9 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6
GR 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8
ES 1.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7
FR 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
IE 3.4 3.1 1.9 1.7 1.7 2.3
IT 0.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6
LU 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8
NL 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6
AT 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7
PT 1.2 2.5 2.4 1.7 1.7 1.9
FI 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.9
SE 2.2 2.5 2.0 1.7 1.7 2.0
UK 2.1 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.9
CY 2.4 2.9 2.8 2.1 1.8 2.4
CZ 3.4 3.2 2.8 2.1 1.8 2.6
EE 5.3 4.2 3.1 2.1 1.8 3.2
HU 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.1 1.8 2.5
LT 5.7 4.1 3.1 2.1 1.8 3.2
LV 6.5 4.9 3.3 2.1 1.8 3.5
MT 1.0 1.9 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.9
PL 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.1 1.8 2.7
SK 3.9 3.6 3.0 2.1 1.8 2.8
SI 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.1 1.8 2.6
EU25 1.5 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8
EU15 1.3 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7
EU12 1.1 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6
EU10 3.6 3.4 2.9 2.1 1.8 2.7  
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 Table 12: Determinants of potential growth rates : employment (annual average growth rates) 
                                        
2004-2010 2011-2020 2021-2030 2031-2040 2041-2050 2004-2050
BE 0.9 0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.0
DK 0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 0.1 -0.1
DE 0.8 0.2 -0.8 -0.6 -0.5 -0.2
GR 0.9 0.2 -0.6 -0.9 -0.9 -0.3
ES 1.9 0.5 -0.4 -1.1 -1.1 -0.1
FR 0.8 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1
IE 2.0 1.0 0.7 0.0 -0.3 0.6
IT 1.1 0.2 -0.5 -0.9 -0.6 -0.2
LU 2.2 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3
NL 0.6 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.0
AT 0.7 0.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2
PT 0.7 -0.1 -0.5 -0.9 -0.9 -0.4
FI 0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1
SE 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
UK 0.7 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0
CY 1.9 1.2 0.1 0.2 -0.3 0.5
CZ 0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -1.1 -1.1 -0.6
EE 0.7 -0.5 -0.7 -0.5 -1.0 -0.4
HU 0.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.9 -0.8 -0.4
LT 0.8 0.1 -0.9 -0.7 -0.9 -0.4
LV 1.2 -0.6 -0.9 -0.6 -1.1 -0.5
MT 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.4
PL 0.7 0.4 -0.2 -0.8 -1.3 -0.3
SK 0.7 0.6 -0.4 -1.2 -1.5 -0.4
SI 0.4 -0.3 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.5
EU25 0.9 0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1
EU15 0.9 0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1
EU12 1.0 0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.1
EU10 1.1 0.2 -0.4 -0.9 -1.2 -0.3  
Table 13: Determinants of labour productivity : Total Factor Productivity (annual average growth rates) 
2004-2010 2011-2020 2021-2030 2031-2040 2041-2050 2004-2050
BE 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
DK 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
DE 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
GR 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0
ES 0.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0
FR 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
IE 2.6 2.0 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.5
IT 0.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0
LU 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
NL 0.7 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
AT 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
PT 0.6 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.2
FI 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.4
SE 1.8 1.8 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.4
UK 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2
CY 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.4
CZ 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.4
EE 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.7
HU 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.4
LT 3.0 2.2 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.8
LV 3.1 2.4 1.9 1.4 1.2 1.9
MT 0.1 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1
PL 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.7
SK 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.7
SI 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.4
EU25 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2
EU15 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
EU12 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
EU10 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.6
* Note:  TFP growth rates can also be seen as the contribution in percentage points to the growth in labour productivity (i.e. GDP 
per person employed). 
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 Table 14: Determinants of labour productivity: capital deepening (contribution in p.p.) 
2004-2010 2011-2020 2021-2030 2031-2040 2041-2050 2004-2050
BE 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
DK 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
DE 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5
GR 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8
ES 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7
FR 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
IE 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8
IT 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5
LU 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7
NL 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
AT 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
PT 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7
FI 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5
SE 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
UK 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7
CY 1.1 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.6 1.0
CZ 2.2 1.6 1.1 0.7 0.6 1.2
EE 2.8 2.1 1.3 0.7 0.6 1.4
HU 2.0 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.6 1.1
LT 2.7 2.0 1.3 0.7 0.6 1.4
LV 3.4 2.6 1.4 0.7 0.6 1.6
MT 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.8
PL 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.6 1.0
SK 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.7 0.6 1.1
SI 2.1 1.6 1.1 0.7 0.6 1.2
EU25 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
EU15 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
EU12 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
EU10 1.6 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.6 1.1  
 
Table 15 : Projected GDP per capita growth rates (period averages) 
2004-2010 2011-2020 2021-2030 2031-2040 2041-2050 2004-2050
BE 2.1 1.8 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.6
DK 1.8 1.8 1.2 1.3 2.0 1.6
DE 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.5
GR 2.6 1.8 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.5
ES 2.0 2.3 1.5 0.8 1.0 1.5
FR 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.6
IE 4.2 3.1 1.9 1.3 1.1 2.2
IT 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.0 1.5 1.5
LU 3.0 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.3
NL 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.9 1.5
AT 1.9 1.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5
PT 1.5 2.3 2.0 1.1 1.2 1.6
FI 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8
SE 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.9
UK 2.4 2.2 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.8
CY 2.9 3.1 2.3 2.0 1.3 2.3
CZ 3.6 3.2 2.5 1.4 1.1 2.3
EE 6.6 4.2 2.8 2.0 1.2 3.1
HU 3.9 3.1 2.6 1.4 1.3 2.4
LT 7.0 4.8 2.5 1.7 1.2 3.2
LV 8.3 5.0 2.8 1.9 1.0 3.5
MT 1.3 2.0 2.4 1.9 1.4 1.8
PL 4.7 4.0 2.9 1.6 1.0 2.7
SK 4.7 4.3 2.8 1.3 0.8 2.7
SI 3.6 2.8 2.2 1.5 1.3 2.2
EU25 2.2 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.7
EU15 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.6
EU12 1.8 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.5
EU10 4.6 3.8 2.7 1.5 1.1 2.6  
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 Table 16 : Projected GDP per capita levels relative to EU15 
2004 2010 2030 2040 2050
BE 108 109 106 108 109
DK 110 110 107 107 111
DE 101 99 94 95 95
GR 72 74 72 70 68
ES 85 86 90 86 81
FR 105 104 101 103 103
IE 132 150 177 176 167
IT 100 98 97 94 94
LU 194 207 225 247 268
NL 108 105 98 100 103
AT 116 117 113 113 112
PT 68 66 73 71 68
FI 108 111 110 114 115
SE 112 115 123 126 129
UK 104 107 111 112 113
CY 81 87 107 113 110
CZ 64 71 89 90 86
EE 46 60 86 91 87
HU 54 60 76 77 75
LT 43 58 86 89 87
LV 42 60 93 99 94
MT 68 65 73 77 76
PL 45 53 75 77 73
SK 48 57 83 83 77
SI 73 80 94 96 94
EU25 92 93 97 97 97
EU15 100 100 100 100 100
EU12 99 98 97 97 96
EU10 50 59 80 82 78  
 
Table 17: Projected productivity levels relative to EU15 
2004 2010 2030 2040 2050
BE 122 121 120 120 120
DK 98 100 100 100 100
DE 94 92 88 88 88
GR 84 80 79 79 79
ES 91 87 88 88 88
FR 113 113 110 110 110
IE 128 143 161 161 161
IT 116 112 108 108 108
LU 129 133 134 134 134
NL 93 94 92 92 92
AT 109 108 106 106 106
PT 60 63 71 71 71
FI 104 108 112 112 112
SE 104 107 116 116 116
UK 95 102 107 107 107
CY 77 77 94 97 97
CZ 59 69 86 90 90
EE 46 58 82 85 86
HU 61 66 81 84 84
LT 46 57 80 83 84
LV 42 57 88 91 92
MT 80 76 81 84 84
PL 54 59 76 78 79
SK 52 58 76 79 80
SI 71 77 96 99 100
EU25 93 94 97 97 98
EU15 100 100 100 100 100
EU12 101 99 98 98 98
EU10 56 62 80 82 83  
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 5.2. Cross-country differences  
All EU25 Member States should experience a marked slowdown in their potential 
growth rates in the future owing to an “across-the-board” demographic decline. 
However, growth rates differ substantially from country to country, as shown in Table 
18. It appears that in the first half of the projection period, productivity growth is  the 
main source of the discrepancy across countries, reflecting different historical trends 
in productivity growth, while employment developments have a dominant role in the 
second half of the projection period due to the mechanical effect of productivity 
convergence, along with uneven demographic developments. It should also be noted 
that productivity growth varies strongly across the EU10 countries. 
 
This results in different changes in projected GDP per capita levels relative to the 
EU15 average across countries, as shown in Table 16. For the EU15, while the 
relative levels of GDP per capita decline somewhat in Austria, Germany, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Italy between 2004 and 2050, they are projected to remain 
broadly unchanged in Belgium, Denmark, France and Portugal and to increase in 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. They are projected 
to increase in all EU10 Member States, although with different speeds. Belgium, 
Cyprus, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom would exceed the EU15 average in terms of GDP 
per capita in 2050. However, these results should not be misinterpreted : a decline in 
the relative levels of GDP per capita does not mean that GDP per capita falls in the 
considered country, but only that the GDP growth rate is lower in that country 
compared with the EU15 average. Indeed, Table 15 clearly shows that GDP per 
capita is projected to grow by at least 1.5% a year on average in all countries over the 
whole projection period. 
 
Table 18 summarises the projection results, by disentangling the GDP growth rate 
into its main components over the entire projection period. The negative impact of 
ageing on the GDP growth rate can clearly be seen, as the contribution from the 
working–age population is projected to be negative for all Member States. In the 
EU25, productivity growth (1.8%) will be the driving force behind GDP growth 
(1.7%), offsetting the slight decline in labour input (-0.1%). Total factor productivity 
will explain two thirds of labour productivity growth, the remaining third being due 
to capital deepening. The decline in labour input is projected to result from the 
declining share of the working-age population (ageing) despite the positive 
contribution of rising employment rates. Total population is expected to be neutral : it 
should remain broadly stable, as the number of elderly should sharply rise and 
compensate for the decline in the younger age groups. Given their economic weight 
in the EU25, the EU15 and the euro area are projected to share the same pattern of 
economic growth as the EU25 as a whole. By contrast, the GDP growth rate is 
projected to be much higher (2.3%) in the EU10 thanks to stronger productivity 
growth (2.6%), which in turn is caused by higher TFP growth and more capital 
deepening. However, labour utilisation is expected to decline faster than in the EU15 
given the combined decline in total population and in the share of the working age 
population (-0.3%). 
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Table 18:  GDP Growth and its main components, 2005-2050 
 GDP  
growth  
in 2005-
2050 
Productivity 
 (GDP per 
person 
employed) 
TFP Capital 
deepening 
Labour 
Input 
Total 
Pop 
Employ-
ment rate 
Share of 
Working 
age 
Pop 
GDP per 
capita growth 
in 2005-2050 
  1=3+6 3=4+5 4 5 6=7+8+9 7 8 9 10=1-7 
BE 1.7 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.3 1.6 
DK 1.7 1.8 1.2 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 1.6 
DE 1.4 1.6 1.1 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.3 -0.3 1.5 
GR 1.4 1.8 1.0 0.8 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 -0.5 1.5 
ES 1.5 1.7 1.0 0.7 -0.1 0.0 0.4 -0.5 1.5 
FR 1.8 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.3 1.6 
IE 2.8 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.3 -0.4 2.1 
IT 1.3 1.6 1.0 0.6 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 -0.4 1.5 
LU 3.1 1.8 1.1 0.8 1.3 0.8 0.7 -0.2 2.3 
NL 1.7 1.6 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.3 1.5 
AT 1.5 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.4 1.5 
PT 1.5 2.0 1.2 0.7 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 1.6 
FI 1.7 1.9 1.4 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.3 1.7 
SE 2.2 2.0 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 -0.2 1.9 
UK 1.9 1.9 1.2 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.2 1.8 
CY 2.9 2.4 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.3 -0.3 2.3 
CZ 1.9 2.6 1.4 1.2 -0.7 -0.3 0.1 -0.5 2.2 
EE 2.6 3.1 1.7 1.4 -0.5 -0.4 0.2 -0.3 3.0 
HU 2.1 2.5 1.4 1.1 -0.4 -0.3 0.2 -0.4 2.3 
LT 2.8 3.1 1.8 1.3 -0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.3 3.1 
LV 3.0 3.5 1.9 1.6 -0.5 -0.5 0.3 -0.3 3.4 
MT 2.4 1.9 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.3 -0.3 1.9 
PL 2.4 2.7 1.7 1.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.5 -0.4 2.7 
SK 2.4 2.8 1.7 1.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.4 -0.4 2.6 
SI 2.1 2.5 1.4 1.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 -0.5 2.2 
EU25 1.7 1.8 1.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.01 0.2 -0.4 1.7 
EU15 1.6 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.3 1.6 
Euro 
area 1.5 1.6 1.1 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.4 1.5 
EU10 2.3 2.6 1.6 1.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.4 -0.4 2.6 
 
6. SENSITIVITY TESTS ON PRODUCTIVITY AND GDP PER CAPITA 
There are three strong reasons to supplement the baseline scenario by a wide set of 
alternative scenarios, which will act as sensitivity tests for the underlying 
assumptions used for the baseline projection.  
• Firstly, and most importantly, productivity projections are particularly 
difficult to make, given the number of different factors explaining its 
development. 
• Secondly, there is no consensus in the academic community as to whether 
productivity should converge across countries and whether it should do so in 
terms of levels or growth rates. Neither is there a consensus regarding the 
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 value of the convergence target. During the peer review process of the AWG 
projections, some analysts argued that the labour productivity assumptions 
might be too optimistic compared with what has been observed in EU 
Member States during recent decades. These critiques warrant running several 
sensitivity tests with lower productivity assumptions. 
• Finally, the baseline projection designed in the framework of the EPC’s 
Ageing Working Group does not capture all the direct and indirect channels 
through which ageing can influence economic growth (e.g. the impact of part-
time employment and changing age-structures on productivity), as the 
projection exercise is carried out on the basis of common and simple 
assumptions to help ensure cross-country consistency and clarity. While these 
gaps do not call into question the main findings of the projections in terms of 
the economic impact of ageing and should be mainly considered as 
refinements (somewhat more difficult to model), it is helpful to assess their 
impact on the projection outcome.  
In order to tackle these potentially relevant issues, which are overlooked in the 
baseline projections, we build 8 scenarios in this section. Two of them specifically 
cover one of four different aspects : the underlying assumptions on labour inputs; the 
impact of changing demographic structures; the choice of TFP growth rate targets; 
and the convergence of productivity to a common level instead of a common growth 
rate. This section will explain the construction of each scenario and spell out its 
particular interest. The results will be systematically compared with the baseline. 
 
6.1. 
                                                
Eight scenarios: rationale and construction 
Except for scenario 1, which also alters the labour input assumptions, the following 
scenarios affect GDP per capita only through the productivity assumptions (TFP and 
capital deepening).  
 
6.1.1. Change in labour input assumptions 
 
Alternative participation rate scenario (Scenario 1), where the age-specific 
participation rates are maintained constant at the 2004 rate. Unlike the baseline, there 
are neither cohort effects nor increases in older-worker participation rates induced by 
recently enacted pension reforms. The effect on productivity growth will be 
transmitted via capital deepening, which increases following the reduction in labour 
inputs, partly offsetting the negative impact on GDP per capita. 
 
Part-time employment scenario (Scenario 2). In the baseline, hours worked are 
assumed constant. We relax this assumption by taking into account the likely increase 
in part-time employment brought about by the rise in female participation rates29. 
This scenario is all the more relevant since the reason for the further decline in hours 
worked over recent years has been an increasing share of people in part-time 
 
29 In this scenario, we assume that the expected strong rise in the number of older workers will not lead to an 
increase in part-time employment, as indicated by the relative stability of the “older-worker part-time employment 
rate” in the last five years, when older-worker employment rates surged by 7% points. 
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 employment30. This scenario uses the regression coefficient of part-time employment 
rates on female participation rates, estimated by Buddelmeyer, Mourre and Ward 
(2004) using a panel of EU15 countries31. Running various estimates, and controlling 
for many effects, the authors found a determination coefficient of between 0.3 and 
0.4. This scenario therefore assumes that a female participation rate increase of 1 p.p. 
gives rise to an increase of 0.35 in total part-time employment. Given that female full-
timers work 40 hours against 20 hours for part-timers, a rise in the proportion of part-
time employment would lead to a reduction in hours worked per person employed 
(compositional effect), reducing the productivity per employee32.  
 
6.1.2. Impact of changing age-structure on productivity  
 
Model-based age-profile scenario –impact of declining youth share on TFP growth 
(Scenario 3 - "age-profile of productivity n°1"). While there is little hard evidence 
on the possible impact of ageing on innovation and TFP, there is a widespread 
suspicion that an older labour force will be less able or willing to create and use new 
technologies. Annex 2 (table 1) shows that ageing could be negatively related to TFP 
growth and estimated that a permanent decline of 10% points in the youth 
dependency ratio (i.e. those aged 0-14 over those aged 15-64) leads to a decrease of 
0.25% points in the annual labour productivity growth rate. We use this estimated 
effect and Eurostat’s population projections (Eurostat 2005) to compute the reduction 
in TFP caused by the changing structure of the population. The issue remains whether 
the youth dependency ratio, albeit a useful indicator, is the most precise measure of 
ageing. The next scenario tries to take into account the complete age profile of the 
workforce, especially at its upper end.  
 
Calibrated age-profile scenario – simulating changes in the age structure of the 
labour force on labour productivity (Scenario 4 - "age-profile of productivity n°2"). 
This scenario is based on the idea that individual productivity varies over time and 
follows an age-profile, bell-shaped, relationship. In this scenario, productivity grows 
at the same pace for all age groups but displays varying levels across age groups. The 
change in overall productivity growth comes from a compositional effect induced by 
population ageing (lower share of youth and prime-age workers in the labour force 
and a higher proportion of older workers).This demography-based scenario uses a 
calibrated age-profile of relative productivity. We consider four age groups, 15-24, 
25-49, 50-54 and 55-64. We also assume that those aged 15-24, 50-54 and 55-64 
display 80%, 90% and 70% of the productivity level of prime-age workers (24-49). 
This is broadly in line with the literature and the bell-shaped age profile of 
productivity (Skirbekk 2003, Börsh-Supan 2003 and 2006). The evidence suggests 
that productivity starts to decline only for those at the upper end of the working-age 
                                                 
30 Average hours worked appear to have slightly declined in 2005, after a marginal pick-up in 2004. This means a 
continuation of the trend decline in hourly labour utilisation, which was assumed to have reverted (or at least 
stopped) in the last number of years. The reason for the further decline is the increasing share of people in part-
time employment. Their share in total employment rose from 17.5% in 2004 to 18.6% in 2005. According to the 
labour force survey, the average number of normally worked hours for one’s main job has neither fallen in full-
time nor in part-time employment. It even increased to 41.6 in 2005 from 41.4 hours per week in 2004 for those in 
full-time employment, while it remained constant at 19.5 hours per week for those in part-time employment. 
31 The part-time employment rate is the ratio of part-time to total employment. 
32 We also assume that men enter the labour market with full-time contracts only, which is consistent with the fact 
that men only represent 22% of those working part-time in the EU25 in 2004. 
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 range (i.e. those aged 55 and over), as the "pure" negative effect of age outweighs the 
positive impact of experience. Given the uncertainty surrounding the relative 
productivity value across ages, we however carry out many sensitivity tests to assess 
how much productivity varies with respect to changes in parameters.  
 
In order to take account of the age structure of the population, we combine the 
projection of employment levels up to 2050 (Carone 2005, EPC 2005) and the 
calibrated relative productivity rates mentioned above. Let us denote P the level of 
employment productivity (assuming unchanged age structure) and E the level of 
employment, while the subscripts a, i, and t refer to the age group, country and year 
respectively. Pa/P25-49 is the productivity of the age group a relative to that of prime-
age workers (aged 25-49), which is supposed to be constant over time and across 
countries. We compute the corrected productivity Pcorrected, which explicitly controls 
for the change in the age-structure of employment from the start of the productivity 
projection:  
{ }
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6.1.3. Changes in TFP growth rate targets  
 
A more pessimistic convergence target for the TFP growth rate in the long run - 
0.8% instead of 1.1% (Scenario 5). In this scenario, the annual TFP growth rate 
converges to 0.8% by 2030 in EU15 countries, instead of 1.1%, while it converges to 
1.3% by 2030 and 0.8% by 2050 in the EU10 countries, instead of 1.75% and 1.1% 
respectively. The rate of 0.8% corresponds to the historical TFP growth rate recorded 
on average since 1990 in the EU1533, while the growth rate used in the baseline is the 
average rate seen over the last three decades (1970-2004) both in the EU15 and in the 
US.  
 
More optimistic (ad-hoc) convergence target for the TFP growth rate in the long 
run (Scenario 6). In this ad-hoc scenario, TFP growth increases so that the labour 
productivity growth rate progressively rises by 0.25 p.p. over the period 2009-2015 in 
comparison with the labour productivity growth rate in the baseline projection. 
Productivity growth thereafter remains 0.25 p.p higher than in the baseline. This 
scenario has been designed by the Ageing Working Group, as a pure sensitivity test 
for the budgetary projections. It is a "symmetric" scenario : if one assumes a 
progressive decline (instead of an increase) in productivity growth, the resulting 
change in productivity levels in 2050 is identical in magnitude - only the sign 
changes.  
 
 
 
                                                 
33 This rate of 0.8%  is  lower than the rate of 1.2% recorded in the US in the same period (1990-2004). 
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 6.1.4. Productivity convergence in levels rather than in growth rates 
 
Convergence in levels for the 10 least productive countries (productivity lower than 
80% of the EU15 average) (Scenario 7). In this scenario, the (ten) countries with a 
productivity level below 80% of that of the EU15 in 2004 (Portugal, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) 
linearly converge toward 80% of the average productivity level reached in 2050 (in 
the baseline) by the eight most productive countries in 2004 (Luxembourg, Ireland, 
Belgium, Italy, France, Austria, Finland and Sweden)34. The latter are characterised 
by the fact that their productivity level is higher than the EU productivity average in 
2004. Moreover, these countries are still the most productive in 2050 in the 
baseline35.  
 
Convergence in the level of the 12 least productive countries (productivity lower 
than 85% of the EU15 average) (Scenario 8). In this scenario, the (twelve) countries 
with a productivity level below 85% of that of the EU15 in 2004 (Greece, Portugal, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia) linearly converge toward 85% of the average productivity 
level reached in 2050 by the eight most productive countries in 2004 (Luxembourg, 
Ireland, Belgium, Italy, France, Austria, Finland and Sweden). 
 
6.2. Main results of sensitivity tests 
We will focus on the impact on the main aggregates (EU25, EU15, the euro area, 
EU10), whilst mentioning the most noticeable cross-country developments. Graph 2 
and Table 19 show the change in the 2050 level of GDP per capita in the different 
alternative scenarios compared with the baseline. Graphs 3, 4 and 5 display the time 
profile of the relative change for each scenario for the EU25, EU15 and EU10 
respectively. 
Graph 2:  Change in the level of GDP per capita in the different scenarios for the EU25 
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34 Productivity levels are expressed in PPS. 
35 Except that Austria becomes the 9th most productive country and the UK the 8th most productive country. 
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 Table 19:  Change in the level of GDP per capita in different scenarios 
 
Percentage of the baseline 
  baseline 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Cumulated 
growth rate 
2004-2005 
Constant 
Partic 
-ipation 
Rate 
Part-
time 
employ
-ment 
Age 
profile of 
prod’y 
n°1 
Age 
profile of 
prod’y 
n°2 
Lower 
TFP 
growth 
rate target 
Higher 
TFP 
growth 
rate 
target 
Prod’y 
in 
levels 
80% 
Prod’y 
in 
levels 
85% 
BE 111% -7.8% -1.2% -2.0% -2.5% -12.4% 9.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
DK 109% -2.2% -0.1% -2.5% -1.5% -12.6% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
DE 97% -6.5% -1.2% -2.2% -3.3% -14.5% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
GR 96% -5.6% -1.2% -0.9% -2.1% -15.2% 10.0% 0.0% 8.6% 
ES 99% -10.3% -2.2% -0.9% -2.7% -18.5% 10.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
FR 105% -5.8% -0.5% -1.4% -1.9% -12.8% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
IE 163% -8.1% -1.8% -4.4% -1.7% -7.0% 10.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
IT 95% -11.5% -1.2% -1.3% -3.3% -17.0% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
LU 188% -6.9% -1.3% -1.7% -2.1% -14.2% 9.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
NL 97% -4.5% -2.2% -1.6% -1.7% -14.2% 9.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
AT 101% -8.3% -1.3% -4.1% -3.3% -13.5% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
PT 110% -5.3% -0.8% -1.0% -2.1% -23.3% 9.9% 28.6% 36.6% 
FI 121% -5.5% -0.4% -0.6% -1.4% -12.9% 10.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
SE 139% -3.2% -0.2% -0.8% -1.0% -14.9% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
UK 124% -3.6% -0.8% -4.2% -1.6% -13.7% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
CY 180% -7.2% -1.3% -12.2% -2.8% -14.3% 9.9% -6.8% -1.0% 
CZ 177% -6.1% -0.7% -2.6% -2.4% -15.1% 9.8% 0.1% 6.4% 
EE 295% -3.9% -0.5% -2.0% -1.5% -8.6% 10.1% 5.8% 12.4% 
HU 189% -7.8% -0.6% -2.0% -2.6% -15.3% 9.9% 7.0% 13.7% 
LT 314% -5.6% -0.6% -7.8% -4.0% -6.7% 10.1% 8.2% 15.0% 
LV 367% -5.5% -0.6% -1.1% -2.0% -5.7% 10.2% -1.0% 5.2% 
MT 132% -9.9% -2.5% -5.3% 0.7% -19.7% 9.8% -0.1% 14.4% 
PL 238% -10.9% -0.7% -6.4% -3.5% -9.3% 10.0% 14.5% 21.7% 
SK 229% -8.3% -0.5% -7.5% -4.0% -9.9% 10.0% 13.8% 20.9% 
SI 168% -8.9% -0.9% -1.3% -3.5% -15.4% 9.8% -9.3% -3.6% 
EU25 119% -6.9% -1.0% -2.5% -2.5% -14.2% 10.0% 1.5% 2.8% 
EU15 108% -6.6% -1.1% -2.1% -2.4% -14.6% 10.0% 0.6% 1.1% 
EU12 103% -7.6% -1.2% -1.7% -2.6% -14.8% 10.0% 0.7% 1.5% 
EU10 223% -8.8% -0.7% -5.1% -3.1% -11.1% 10.0% 8.9% 15.8% 
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 Graph 3:  Change in the level of GDP per capita in the EU 25 in different scenarios 
Percentage of the baseline 
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Graph 4:  Change in the level of GDP per capita in the EU 15 in different scenarios 
Percentage of the baseline   
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 Graph 5:  Change in the level of GDP per capita in the EU 10 in different scenarios 
Percentage of the baseline   
 Fairly moderate changes     Strong changes 
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6.2.1. GDP per capita impact of assuming no change in participation rates is much 
greater than an assumed rise in the share of part-time employment   
As suggested by Graph 2 and Table 19, assuming a constant participation rate at its 
2004 level would lead to a relatively large negative effect on GDP per capita 
compared with the baseline (-7%). This drop would have been greater but for an 
associated rise in labour productivity owing to further capital deepening caused by the 
reduction in labour supply. Without the latter, the fall would have been around -11%. 
Graph 3 suggests that the "loss" in GDP per capita is quite rapid at the start of the 
projection period but stabilises at its long term level in 2025, when the cohort effect 
in the baseline comes to an end. The fall is slightly more pronounced in the euro area 
and the EU10, as it is particularly sharp in Spain, Italy and Poland. 
 
In contrast, an assumption of a decline in hours worked provoked by a rise in part-
time employment, which is likely to accompany the upward movement in female 
participation rates, only leads to a very slight change in GDP per capita in the EU25 
relative to the baseline (-1%). The highest changes, seen in Spain, the Netherlands 
and Malta, are only about -2%. The bulk of these small effects is expected to be seen 
before 2025.  
 
The results derived from the first two scenarios confirm the findings of the labour 
market literature that the potential for higher labour utilisation in Europe is to be 
sought more from a rise in  participation rates ("extensive margin") rather than from a 
change in hours worked per person ("intensive margin"). 
 
6.2.2. The negative effect of a change in the population age-structure is fairly 
limited  
Scenario 3 ("age profile of productivity n°1") suggests that taking into account the 
change in the youth share in total population will cut the level of EU25 GDP per 
capita by only 2.5%, corresponding to a decline of around 0.05% points in annual 
productivity growth rates. This is a fairly moderate, albeit not negligible, effect. 
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 However, the fall is projected to be severe in some EU10 countries (Cyprus, Malta, 
Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia). The profile of the impact on GDP per capita over 
time might look strange in the EU10 and, consequently in the EU25 as a whole, but it 
is fully explained by the presence of a double "baby boom"36 in the EU10 that will 
unfold its effects over the period of projections.  
 
 
Table 20:  Sensitivity test : change in the level of GDP per capita reached in 2050 for different age-profiles of 
labour productivity (Percentage of the baseline) 
Age profile of productivity (prime-age worker productivity=100) 
15-24 80% 90% 
25-49 100% 100% 
50-54 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 
55-64 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 
BE -1.3% -2.1% -3.2% -4.2% -5.2% -6.3% -1.3% -2.2% -3.2% -4.1% -5.1% -6.2% 
DK -1.1% -1.2% -1.8% -2.2% -2.7% -3.2% -0.7% -1.1% -1.5% -1.9% -2.3% -2.8% 
DE -1.7% -2.9% -4.2% -5.6% -7.0% -8.4% -1.8% -3.0% -4.3% -5.6% -7.0% -8.5% 
GR -0.9% -2.0% -3.0% -4.1% -5.3% -6.6% -1.1% -2.2% -3.2% -4.4% -5.5% -6.8% 
ES -1.1% -2.6% -4.0% -5.5% -7.1% -8.7% -1.5% -2.9% -4.3% -5.9% -7.4% -9.1% 
FR -1.3% -1.7% -2.7% -3.4% -4.2% -5.0% -1.3% -2.0% -2.7% -3.4% -4.2% -5.0% 
IE -0.5% -1.7% -3.0% -4.3% -5.7% -7.1% -1.1% -2.3% -3.6% -4.9% -6.3% -7.7% 
IT -1.8% -3.0% -4.4% -5.8% -7.3% -8.8% -1.8% -3.1% -4.5% -5.8% -7.3% -8.8% 
LU -1.1% -1.9% -2.8% -3.7% -4.7% -5.7% -1.0% -1.9% -2.7% -3.7% -4.6% -5.6% 
NL -1.0% -1.4% -2.2% -2.9% -3.6% -4.3% -0.9% -1.5% -2.1% -2.7% -3.4% -4.1% 
AT -1.7% -3.0% -4.5% -6.0% -7.5% -9.1% -1.8% -3.2% -4.6% -6.1% -7.6% -9.2% 
PT -0.9% -1.9% -2.9% -4.0% -5.1% -6.3% -1.2% -2.1% -3.2% -4.2% -5.3% -6.5% 
FI -1.1% -1.2% -2.0% -2.5% -3.0% -3.6% -1.1% -1.5% -2.0% -2.5% -3.0% -3.5% 
SE -0.9% -0.9% -1.3% -1.5% -1.8% -2.1% -0.7% -0.9% -1.2% -1.4% -1.6% -1.9% 
UK -0.9% -1.5% -2.4% -3.2% -4.1% -5.0% -1.0% -1.8% -2.5% -3.3% -4.2% -5.1% 
CY -1.4% -2.6% -4.2% -5.7% -7.3% -9.0% -1.8% -3.2% -4.6% -6.1% -7.7% -9.3% 
CZ -1.4% -2.3% -3.2% -4.1% -5.1% -6.2% -1.7% -2.5% -3.4% -4.4% -5.4% -6.4% 
EE -0.8% -1.5% -2.1% -2.9% -3.6% -4.4% -1.1% -1.8% -2.5% -3.2% -4.0% -4.8% 
HU -1.5% -2.4% -3.6% -4.7% -5.9% -7.1% -1.7% -2.7% -3.8% -4.9% -6.0% -7.3% 
LT -2.1% -3.6% -5.3% -7.1% -8.9% 
-
10.9% -2.3% -3.9% -5.5% -7.3% -9.1% 
-
11.1% 
LV -1.0% -1.9% -2.7% -3.6% -4.6% -5.6% -1.4% -2.2% -3.1% -4.0% -4.9% -5.9% 
MT 0.6% 0.5% 0.1% -0.2% -0.6% -0.9% 0.1% -0.2% -0.5% -0.8% -1.2% -1.5% 
PL -2.0% -3.3% -4.9% -6.5% -8.1% -9.7% -2.2% -3.6% -5.1% -6.7% -8.3% -9.9% 
SK -2.2% -3.6% -5.5% -7.3% -9.1% 
-
11.0% -2.5% -4.1% -5.8% -7.5% -9.4% 
-
11.3% 
SI -1.8% -3.1% -4.6% -6.1% -7.6% -9.2% -2.1% -3.5% -4.9% -6.4% -7.9% -9.5% 
EU25 -1.4% -2.3% -3.5% -4.6% -5.8% -7.0% -1.5% -2.5% -3.6% -4.7% -5.8% -7.1% 
EU15 -1.3% -2.2% -3.3% -4.4% -5.5% -6.7% -1.4% -2.4% -3.4% -4.5% -5.6% -6.7% 
EU12 -1.4% -2.4% -3.6% -4.7% -6.0% -7.2% -1.5% -2.6% -3.7% -4.8% -6.0% -7.3% 
EU10 -1.8% -2.9% -4.3% -5.7% -7.1% -8.6% -2.0% -3.3% -4.6% -5.9% -7.4% -8.8% 
Note: In these sensitivity tests,  the age structure of the population is that given by the baseline (see Carone 2005). 
Therefore, the labour input is  left unaffected. As a result, the changes in GDP per capita in 2050 as a percentage 
of the baseline level are strictly equal to those in productivity levels in 2050 as a percentage of the productivity 
level in the baseline. 
 
                                                 
36While the age groups 15-30 and 45-55 are very large, those below 15, aged 30-40 and over 60 are much less 
numerous.  
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 Scenario 4 ("age profile of productivity n°2") confirms the findings of scenario 3 : a 
drop of only 2.3% is expected in the EU25 when considering a change in the age-
structure of employment. This change will translate into an increase in the share of 
older age groups at the expense of young and prime age workers which are expected 
to have a higher productivity. It illustrates the extent of the compositional effects 
when one assumes different productivity levels by age. In this scenario, which is 
more comprehensive than the previous one, the disparity across countries is smaller, 
although the impact remains slightly stronger in the EU10 than in the EU15.  
The main difference between the two scenarios is in the timing of the decrease in 
living standards. The drop in GDP per capita occurs very rapidly in scenario 4 as the 
proportion of older workers also increases relatively quickly until 2020, due to the 
population ageing and the increase in the “older worker employment rate” induced by 
enacted pension reforms37. In contrast, in scenario 3, the fall takes place almost 
linearly, following the gradual decline in the youth dependency ratio, fostered by low 
and stalling fertility rates.  
 
Table 20 presents a large set of sensitivity tests, using various profiles of relative 
productivity across age groups. Simulations show that to get  a 5% decline compared 
with the baseline productivity level (i.e. a 0.1% point decline in annual average 
productivity growth rates) would imply assuming that  the productivity of those aged 
50-54 and 55-64 is only 70% and 50% of that of prime-age workers respectively, 
which is obviously very pessimistic. Looking further, lowering the relative 
productivity of  young workers by 10% points only has a marginal impact on the 
simulation. More importantly, cutting the relative productivity of prime-aged workers 
by 10% points, which is huge, leads to a GDP per capita decline of only 1.1% points 
for the EU15 and 1.4% points for the EU10 at the end of the projection horizon. In 
the most extreme simulation (in which the productivity of those 55-64 is even below 
one third of that of prime age employees), only two small countries (Lithuania and 
Slovakia) record a GDP per capita fall greater than 10% (i.e. a 0.2% point decline in 
annual average productivity growth rates) and in Poland the fall is very close to 10 
per cent. 
 
This confirms the main finding by Börsh-Supan (2003) that even though the profile of 
productivity varies strongly with the age of employees, its impact on aggregate labour 
productivity would be small, and would not alter the projection results very much. 
 
6.2.3. Changing the TFP growth rate assumption could strongly affect the 
projections  
 
Taking a convergence target of 0.8% for TFP growth by 2030 in EU15 and by 2050 
in EU10, rather than 1.1% in the baseline, has a considerable effect by 2050. It 
decreases GDP per capita by 14.6% points in the EU15 (i.e. a 0.3% point decline in 
annual productivity growth rates) and by 11% points in the EU10. The GDP per 
capita drop is particularly strong for Spain, Italy, Portugal and Malta.  
 
                                                 
37 The share of older workers in the EU25 is projected to increase from 10.4% in 2004 to 17.3% in 2050, while the 
share of younger (15-24) is projected to fall from 11.3% to 10.1% and the prime-aged from 78.3% to 72.6%.  
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 This shows that the convergence hypothesis for TFP growth is a crucial assumption. 
Therefore, a natural question arises (one in fact which was raised in the peer review 
of the baseline budgetary projections) whether the labour productivity growth rate 
assumptions are too optimistic compared with what has been observed in EU Member 
States recently38. Generally speaking, productivity projections are particularly 
difficult to make, given the number of different factors explaining its development. 
There is moreover no consensus in the academic community whether productivity 
should converge across countries and whether it should do so in terms of levels or 
growth rates. More specifically, several remarks are warranted : 
• First and foremost, given the very long-term time horizon of the budgetary 
projections (up to 2050), the Commission and the AWG have based the 
productivity assumption on longer term developments, and not on the medium 
term observations since 1990, which are influenced by specific factors. The 
assumption of TFP convergence to 1.1% per annum corresponds to the growth 
rate recorded for the EU as a whole over a long period of time (1970-2004). 
This rate is almost identical to that experienced in the leading economy in the 
world, i.e. the US over the same period. Indeed, it would be an excessively 
pessimistic scenario to focus on the most recent period, which would mean 
that there would be no ICT catching-up in Europe in the long-run.  
• Secondly, the productivity assumptions are slightly lower than those in the 
2001 budgetary exercise (by 0.1 percentage points over the whole projection 
period). They are also very much in line with the assumptions used by 
international organisations (e.g. the OECD, which assumes a targeted growth 
rate of productivity of 1.7% consistent with 1.1% TFP growth) and national 
authorities (e.g. Australia) when making long-run budgetary projections.  
 
Regarding scenario 6, the conclusions to be drawn do not add much to the insights 
provided by scenario 5. Its main merit is to stress that, symmetrically, an assumption 
of higher productivity growth (¼% point) leads to a strong increase in GDP per capita 
by 2050.  
 
6.2.4. An assumption of productivity convergence in levels substantially alters the 
projections for most EU10 countries whilst leaving the EU15 almost unchanged.  
Scenarios 7 and 8 stress that establishing a reasonable convergence rule in levels (i.e. 
80% or 85%) instead of the growth rate convergence rule embedded in the baseline 
only has a moderate impact on EU25 GDP per capita (+1.5% and +2.8% respectively, 
compared with the baseline). This result is due to the fact that only the EU10 
countries are affected and their weight is limited (the EU10 total population 
represents a maximum of only 16% of the EU25 population over the projection 
horizon). In the EU15, only Portugal (scenario 7) or Portugal and Greece (scenario 8) 
are affected (albeit strongly), so that setting up a reasonable convergence rule in 
levels only has a negligible impact on EU15 GDP per capita (0.6% and 1.1% 
respectively)39. The other EU15 countries are left unchanged by these two scenarios, 
as their productivity levels are above the threshold of 85% of the EU15 average. In 
                                                 
38 In particular, some observers draw attention to the fact that, in the baseline scenario, total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth has been declining in the main EU15 countries since 1990, averaging only 0.8%.  
39 In scenario 8, Greece gains more than 8% relative to the baseline level of GDP per capita, while GDP per capita 
in Portugal increases by more than one third.  
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 contrast, the effect of the convergence rule is very significant in the EU10 countries, 
ranging from 8.9% to 15.8%. While Cyprus, Latvia and Slovenia lose out a bit 
compared with the baseline, some EU10 countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Slovakia) display a sharp productivity increase relative to the baseline40. 
 
It should be noted that changing the convergence target from 80% of EU15 labour 
productivity to 85% strongly affects the results of the low-productivity countries, 
broadening the gap with the baseline by 6% points in 2050, although it does not 
significantly change the number of "converging countries". Only Malta and Greece 
join the convergence club in scenario 8 compared with scenario 7.  
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the context of the Commission’s services and the EPC’s common projections 
exercise on the public spending and growth implications of ageing populations, the 
present paper presents an overview of the long run productivity and growth effects 
from an application of the agreed production function (PF) methodology. This PF 
approach forms the central element of the macro assumptions part of the overall 
exercise. It is a variant of the ECOFIN Council agreed method used for the 
calculation of potential growth rates and output gaps when assessing the annual 
stability and convergence programmes. The approach is also based on a series of 
assumptions regarding the components of the production function (population, 
unemployment, participation rates, capital formation and TFP). In this approach, 
projected productivity is the outcome of an extrapolation of recent trends; of an 
assessment of the medium-run effects of demographics on capital deepening; and of 
some long run convergence assumptions regarding TFP (i.e. a return to the long-term 
historical average for the period 1970-2005). 
 
Some of the most important points which the present paper has underlined are as 
follows : 
 
• Firstly, the long run growth scenarios presented in the paper are based on the 
introduction of the EPC-AWG agreed assumptions for NAIRU’s, participation 
rates and labour productivity, as well as Eurostat’s latest demographic 
projections, into ECFIN’s production function methodology41. This 
methodology provides an effective overall framework for the macroeconomic 
part of the 2006 projections, with its transparency adding to the credibility of 
the overall exercise and with the budgetary surveillance process being 
enhanced by having one consistent analytical framework.  
 
• Secondly, in terms of the forecast methodology used, the GDP projections are 
based on an assumptions-driven extrapolation of recent trends in employment 
and labour productivity. All long-run projections need to be interpreted with 
caution, especially productivity projections, given the number of different 
                                                 
40 In the baseline, Cyprus, Latvia and Slovenia show a strong catching-up of productivity - exceeding 80% of the 
average productivity of the 8 most productive countries. This is due to the combination of a relatively high starting 
level of productivity in 2004 (Cyprus, Slovenia); more favourable demographic developments (Latvia, Cyprus); 
and very strong productivity growth rates at the start of the projection (Latvia, Slovenia).  
41 See Denis et al. (2006). 
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 factors explaining its development. There is moreover no consensus in the 
academic community whether productivity should converge across countries 
and whether it should do so in terms of levels or growth rates. They therefore 
remain projections, not forecasts. They only provide an indication as to what 
would happen on the basis of current policy settings under a number of 
prudent and transparent assumptions. In particular, the projected labour 
productivity growth rates rely on cross-country-consistent rules regarding the 
path of total factor productivity and of related capital stock developments. 
Although such patterns may or may not be realised over the coming decades, 
the projections are nevertheless based on the reasonable principle that whilst 
cross-country discrepancies in labour productivity growth rates are a plausible 
feature over a short to medium term time span, these differences should not be 
projected to persist indefinitely. In this context, the present exercise assumes 
that these divergences will fade away towards the end of the projection 
horizon.  
 
• Thirdly, regarding the specific results which emanate from the application of 
this EPC-AWG agreed forecasting methodology, the most important 
conclusion to be underlined is the extent of the negative effects from ageing 
on EU potential growth rates :  
 
o The EU’s present annual average potential growth rate of roughly 2 ½ 
% is projected to be cut in half over the coming decades, underlining 
why “grey” pressure has rapidly emerged as one of the key medium to 
long run policy concerns in the EU. This halving in potential growth 
rates will occur despite relatively favourable labour productivity 
projections, thereby underlining the extremely negative labour supply 
implications of Eurostat’s latest population projections.  
 
o The projected fall in potential growth rates is much higher in the new 
Member States, compared with those countries which constitute the 
old EU15 aggregate. For the EU10, potential growth rates of 4.7% 
between 2004 and 2010 are projected to fall to only a small fraction of 
that rate (i.e. 0.6%) between 2041 and 2050. This is much lower than 
the projected growth rate of 1.3% expected for the EU15 grouping 
over the same period. While these developments partly reflect the fact 
that the EU10 and EU15 productivity growth rates are assumed to 
have converged by that time, they are nevertheless, in the main, driven 
by less favourable demographic developments. 
 
• Finally, various sensitivity tests are carried out to check the impact of some 
factors, which have been excluded from the baseline scenario for reasons of 
simplicity. The main findings are:  
 
o Firstly, the impact of changes in the participation rate assumption have 
a much greater effect on GDP per capita developments compared with 
assumed changes in the share of part-time employment (i.e. in average 
hours worked per worker). More specifically, a rise in the share of part-
time employment, driven by the projected increase in female 
participation rates, will only have a relatively weak impact on GDP per 
 - 56 -
 capita outcomes whereas participation rate changes have the potential 
to have much greater effects.  
 
o Secondly, the negative effect of changes in the population age-
structure appears to be fairly limited, although the labour productivity 
of an individual is likely to decline after the age of 55. A very strong 
productivity fall in the older age groups would be required to 
significantly depress the aggregate labour productivity growth rate. 
Such a scenario appears, at the present time, to be unlikely.  
 
o Thirdly, changes in the assumed TFP growth rate targets could 
strongly affect the projections. More precisely, allowing TFP growth 
to converge towards the average growth rate recorded in EU15 since 
the start of the 1990’s (i.e. 0.8%), rather than towards the long term 
average over the last 3-4 decades (i.e. 1.1%), leads to a strong decline 
in GDP per capita vis-à-vis the baseline. 
 
o Finally, an assumption of productivity convergence in levels (as 
opposed to growth rates) substantially alters the projections for most 
of the EU10 countries but leaves the EU15 almost unchanged. The 
choice of the convergence target (i.e. 80% or 85%) has a considerable 
impact on the outcome of the simulations. 
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 Slovak Republic
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ANNEX 2: EFFECTS OF AGEING ON LONG RUN LABOUR 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH : A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
ASSESSMENT 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
DG ECFIN has two broad methodologies for estimating medium to long run labour 
productivity trends. The first ECFIN method is largely a statistical approach based on 
a production function (PF) methodology, as presented in the main text of this paper. 
The second ECFIN method is based on an analytical framework which combines 
standard growth regressions with recent developments in endogenous growth theory. 
In essence this approach assesses the relative merits of the major hypotheses for 
explaining productivity growth over time – i.e. the role played by the regulatory 
environment (product, labour and financial markets); by the degree of openness of 
economies; by the efficiency of knowledge production (R&D and education); by the 
determinants of physical investment levels; and finally by demographics.  A short 
overview of this second ECFIN method is given below, with a detailed description of 
the overall approach contained in Denis, Mc Morrow and Röger (2004 a and b).  
 
The purpose of the present note is to show how this analytical framework can be used 
to provide insights for the Ageing Working Group (AWG) into the effects of ageing 
on long-run labour productivity trends in the EU15 and EU10 countries. While the 
overall framework covers much more than demographics, the present note 
concentrates on this latter issue given its direct relevance to the work of the AWG.  
Following the description of the ECFIN approach given in section 1, section 2 goes 
on to examine the specific risk of ageing for labour productivity over the long run, 
concentrating on both the theoretical and empirical issues involved. This section also 
provides estimates of the likely magnitude of the problem and the type of measures 
which could be considered to offset the negative effects which are predicted.  
 
SECTION 1 :  OVERVIEW OF ECFIN’S LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY MODEL 
 
The achievement of a better understanding of the key determinants of productivity 
growth has been high on the research agenda of international organisations and the 
academic community for some decades now. ECFIN’s research in this area represents 
an attempt to combine a detailed knowledge of these growth determinants (based on 
reviews of the literature and regression analysis) with the central policy concerns of 
European governments. It identifies five areas which are both quantitatively 
important for productivity and relevant in a European context i.e. the level of 
regulation; the structure of financial markets; the degree of product market 
integration; the size of knowledge investment; and the ageing of the labour force. In 
order to integrate all these diverse aspects into a unifying framework, growth 
regressions were used to draw lessons from the growth experiences of OECD member 
states over the last 2½ decades. On the analytical side an attempt was made to 
integrate recent developments in endogenous growth theory into the specification. 
This burgeoning growth literature combined with the distinctive nature of recent 
growth patterns has underlined the importance of knowledge production for 
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 productivity growth. In broad terms growth theory isolates two productivity 
enhancing channels, namely capital deepening and technical progress which is 
deemed proportional to knowledge. By looking at how these basic growth elements 
affect knowledge and physical capital formation, one can establish a more nuanced 
understanding of the channels through which they affect productivity.  
 
As stressed in Denis et al. (2004a), when interpreting recent productivity trends in the 
EU and the US, two main questions arise : 
 
• Firstly, how do the basic growth determinants (Diagram 1) affect physical 
investment and knowledge production (see 1.1); and  
 
• Secondly, what is the relative importance of physical and knowledge capital 
formation for productivity growth (see 1.2). 
 
D I A G R A M  1  :  B A S I C  G R O W T H  D E T E R M I N A N T S
A .  S I Z E  O F  G O V E R N M E N T
B .  D E G R E E  O F  R E G U L A T I O N
C .  F I N A N C I A L  M A R K E T S
1 .  I N S T I T U T I O N A L
F A C T O R S
2 .  M A R K E T
S I Z E
A .  D E G R E E  O F  T R A D E
O P E N N E S S
B .  P O P U L A T I O N  S I Z E
3 .  D E M O G R A P H I C S  +
L A B O U R  S U P P L Y
A .  Y O U T H  D E P E N D E N C Y  R A T I O
B .  L A B O U R  S U P P L Y  ( M E A S U R E D
A S  H O U R S  W O R K E D )
4 .  P H Y S I C A L  A N D
H U M A N  C A P I T A L
+
T O T A L  F A C T O R  P R O D U C T I V I T Y
( i . e .  K N O W L E D G E )
A .  P H Y S I C A L  I N V E S T M E N T
- D o m e s t i c  I n v e s t m e n t  ( I C T + N o n - I C T )
- F o r e i g n  D i r e c t  I n v e s t m e n t  ( F D I )
B .  E D U C A T I O N  L E V E L S
C .  K N O W L E D G E  I N V E S T M E N T
( R & D  I N T E N S I T Y )
 
1.1 HOW DO THE BASIC GROWTH DETERMINANTS AFFECT INVESTMENT AND 
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION ?  At the outset, one must stress that when analysing all 
forms of investment one has to take into account the fact that its structure is changing 
over time in at least two important dimensions:  
• Firstly, the growth in the importance of more knowledge intensive forms of 
investment (such as ICT and R&D spending); and   
• Secondly, the observed increase in the international mobility of capital (FDI 
assets have grown from around 5% of world GDP in the mid 1980s to over 
15% at the end of the 1990s).  
 
DETERMINANTS OF PHYSICAL INVESTMENT  
 
Amongst all the various growth determinants assessed in the regression analysis 
carried out for the 2004 study, regulation appeared to be the most important driver of 
investment rates. The degree of regulation plays an especially important role for 
foreign direct investment but it is also a crucial driver for new forms of investment 
such as ICT. There is also some evidence that equity based financial systems are 
more favourable to physical investment. Again, FDI flows are positively correlated 
with a more equity based structure for financial markets. Finally, education appears to 
be an important factor for foreign direct investment. These results suggest that in an 
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 environment characterised by increasing international capital mobility, levels of 
regulation, financial market conditions and human capital endowments are important 
determinants for the attractiveness of a country as an investment location.  
 
DETERMINANTS OF R&D INVESTMENT 
 
The determinants of knowledge investment are different to those of physical 
investment. Firstly, R&D is less affected by the regulatory environment. What seems 
to be more important for R&D is market size as measured by openness and 
population size. The lack of importance of regulation for R&D could be due to the 
fact that entry barriers are less significant for R&D activities which are typically 
concentrated amongst incumbent firms. Also, theoretically the link between 
regulation and research intensity is less clearcut. Given the sunk cost nature of R&D 
activities, the prospects of more secure rents provided by product market regulations 
(for example in the form of higher protection against violation of property rights from 
new inventions) may act as an incentive for R&D. The sunk cost nature of R&D also 
makes it plausible that market size matters in that firms located in more open and/or 
larger economies will typically engage more strongly in R&D activities. Investments 
in R&D are usually more risky than in physical investments and therefore the attitude 
of all financial institutions towards the financing of such investments is important. 
More market based financing mechanisms, including equity markets and venture 
capital funds, tend to favour riskier investments.  
 
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION : THE EFFECT OF R&D, EDUCATION, MARKET SIZE 
AND DEMOGRAPHIC INFLUENCES  
 
In addition to analysing the specific determinants of R&D investment, the 2004 study 
also assessed the role of R&D as one element in the overall knowledge production 
process in economies. In this context, the empirical growth literature emphasises 
knowledge and the creation of knowledge via the investment activities of firms, 
households and the government in both R&D and education as crucial for enhancing 
the level of technology (i.e. TFP). The empirical evidence strongly supports the view 
that R&D and education are significant drivers of total factor productivity. Trade 
openness/market size also appears to be especially important. Finally, the regression 
results strongly underpin the view that an ageing labour force has a negative effect on 
TFP. This latter result is discussed in much greater detail in Section 2 below. 
 
K E Y  D E T E R M I N A N T S
D I A G R A M  2  :  L A B O U R  P R O D U C T I V I T Y  D E T E R M I N A N T S
( W H A T  A R E  T H E  K E Y  D R I V E R S  O F  I N V E S T M E N T  +  T O T A L  F A C T O R  P R O D U C T I V I T Y )
C A P I T A L  D E E P E N I N G
( C A P I T A L  I N T E N S I T Y )
T O T A L  F A C T O R
P R O D U C T I V I T Y
L A B O U R
S U P P L Y  ( H O U R S
W O R K E D )
K N O W L E D G E  P R O D U C T I O N
F U N C T I O N  ( R & D  D E T E R M I N A N T S )
R E G U L A T O R Y
E N V I R O N M E N T
S I Z E  O F
G O V E R N M E N T
O P E N N E S S  +
C O U N T R Y  S I Z E
F I N A N C I A L
M A R K E T S
E D U C A T I O N
S I Z E  +  A G E
S T R U C T U R E  O F
P O P U L A T I O N S
F I N A N C I A L
M A R K E T S
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1.2 : WHAT IS THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF PHYSICAL INVESTMENT AND 
KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL FORMATION FOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH ?  
Section 1.1  described how the basic growth determinants affect physical capital 
formation and the creation of knowledge. The present section looks at the relative 
contribution of these two factors to labour productivity growth when they are 
combined with two other factors, namely the growth in the employment rate and the 
potential for catching-up. The neoclassical growth model makes fairly precise 
quantitative predictions concerning these four factors, with the estimated labour 
productivity growth contributions from the ECFIN model being very close to those 
predicted by the neoclassical model. The main results are given in Table 1 below :   
 
TABLE 1 : OVERVIEW OF LONG RUN EFFECTS OF LABOUR  
PRODUCTIVITY DETERMINANTS 
 
MAJOR DETERMINANTS 
EFFECT ON ANNUAL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH RATE (PERCENTAGE POINTS) (LEVEL 
EFFECTS IN BRACKETS*) 
PHYSICAL INVESTMENTS + REGULATION (CAPITAL DEEPENING EFFECTS) 
1. Physical Investment  
(Permanent 1 % point increase in GFCF) 
 
0.05 (2.4) 
2. Regulation  
(EU moving to US levels of regulation) 
 
0.15 (4.6) 
KNOWLEDGE INVESTMENTS (TFP EFFECTS) 
3. R&D  (Permanent 1% point of GDP increase in 
R&D spending)  
 
0.60 (17.7) 
4. Education (Permanent 1 year increase in average 
education levels of labour force) 
 
0.45 (12.8) 
5. Ageing (Permanent 10% points decline in youth 
dependency ratio) 
 
-0.25 (-6.8)** 
6. Openness & Market Size (Permanent 10% points 
increase in intra-Euro area trade) 
 
0.10 (3.0) 
HOURS WORKED + CATCHING UP (CAPITAL DEEPENING EFFECTS) 
7. Permanent 1 % point increase in Hours Worked -0.25 (-7.1) 
8. Catching-Up GDP per capita levels gap closed by roughly 2% on an 
annual average basis***  
* Most of the level effects are evident after 25-30 years. 
** This is the minimum TFP estimate we obtain in our regression work.  This estimate excludes the positive capital deepening 
effects which, with a 10% points decline in the youth dependency ratio, would be equal to roughly 3%, implying therefore that 
the net overall effect of ageing on labour productivity would be negative (i.e. 3.8% in level terms / roughly 0.1 off the annual 
growth rate of labour productivity). 
***This is a capital deepening effect (i.e. countries with a relatively low stock of capital tend to have higher rates of labour 
productivity growth) since identical TFP growth rates are assumed for the countries concerned.  In addition, this speed of 
convergence represents the average for all of the countries in the sample, with individual country performances varying widely. 
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 SECTION 2 :  AGEING AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY42
 
An unavoidable consequence of declining birth rates is an ageing of the labour force. 
While so far there has been little research carried out on the possible consequences of 
ageing for productivity, nevertheless there is a widespread suspicion that an older 
labour force will be less adept in creating and adopting new technologies. Given the 
magnitude of the demographic transition in Europe, it seems appropriate to explore 
the possible consequences for productivity of this “greying” phenomenon. 
 
GOING BEYOND THE CONVENTIONAL NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH MODEL FOR 
ANALYSING THE EFFECTS OF POPULATION GROWTH ON PRODUCTIVITY  
 
The framework used in DG ECFIN’s medium term analysis is basically a 
conventional neoclassical growth model consisting of a production function with 
constant returns to scale and exogenous technical progress and a simple investment 
rule where investment/saving is proportional to GDP. In earlier work we showed how 
the investment rule could be modified in order to become consistent with long term 
population trends. This present paper deals with attempts to endogenise TFP within 
this framework. This represents an additional issue of relevance in the context of long 
term demographic scenarios for two reasons : 
 
• Firstly, changes in the birth rate and the implied age structure of the labour 
force could have effects on the efficiency of labour and the rate of technical 
progress; and 
 
• Secondly, one might be interested in quantitatively analysing certain policy 
measures in order to stimulate the rate of technical progress such as to 
compensate for the income losses associated with ageing. 
 
This section is organised as follows. Firstly, we briefly state the standard neoclassical 
growth model and present the predictions of this model concerning the long term 
level and growth rate effects of changes in the population growth rate. In a second 
step we look at two possible extensions of this model aimed at endogenising TFP. 
The first extension is in the spirit of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and basically 
consists of adding measures of human capital to the production function. This allows 
for endogenous level shifts of TFP but leaves the long run growth rate of TFP 
unaffected and not to be explained within the model. Such a modification has 
consequences in a demographic context to the extent that the efficiency of labour is 
cohort specific. A second extension is more radical and is based on the new 
endogenous growth literature which tries to model the long run growth rate of TFP as 
a function of human capital investment. In these models demographic factors are even 
more pertinent since population growth is tied in closely with the rate of knowledge 
production. The empirical results presented in this paper draw heavily on two sources, 
firstly the results presented in the EU Economy Review 2003 study and on recent 
results from Jones (2002). This latter paper, to the best of our knowledge, represents 
                                                 
42 References for Section 2  include:  European Commission (2003); Jones, C. I. (2002);  Mankiw, N. Romer, D. 
and D. Weil (1992);. Solow, R. M. (1956); Temple, J. (1999). 
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 one of the very few attempts made by researchers to confront endogenous growth 
models with data (in this case data for the US).    
  
2.1 : THE SOLOW MODEL 
 
 The Solow model consists of four relationships : 
 
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE TECHNOLOGY : neoclassical production function (constant 
returns to  scale, exogenous TFP, with growth rate g) : 
 
(1)  αα −= 1)( tttt TFPLKY
 
B. AN EQUILIBRIUM CONDITION FOR THE GOODS MARKET : 
 
(2)  ttt ICY +=
 
C. A BEHAVIOURAL RULE FOR INVESTMENT (or alternatively consumption) : 
 
(3)  tt YsI (.)=
 
D. AN ACCOUNTING IDENTITY, LINKING THE CAPITAL STOCK TO INVESTMENT : 
 
(4) 1)1( −−== ttt KIK δ  
 
Employment is exogenous to the model but a labour market can easily be added as is 
done in DG ECFIN’s medium term growth model, where the employment trend is 
determined by the medium term participation rate and the NAIRU. The growth rate of 
the population of working age (n)  is exogenous. 
 
This model makes two well known predictions on the impact of population growth on 
labour productivity : 
 
1. The (balanced) growth rate of labour productivity is equal to the rate of labour 
augmenting technical progress and therefore independent of the growth rate of 
population. 
 
2. The long run level of productivity is a negative function of the population 
growth rate. This means that, over a transition period, economies with lower 
population/labour force growth rates enjoy higher labour productivity growth.  
 
This second effect is generated via an increase in the capital / labour ratio. This 
occurs because with the same investment rate more capital deepening is possible 
since fewer entrants to the labour force have to be equipped with capital. The long run 
productivity level (Y/L) effect of a change in population growth (n), the investment 
rate (s) or the growth rate of TFP (g) can be calculated easily from the following 
expression :  
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With standard parameter values and the growth rates observed for OECD countries, 
this expression predicts that a 1% decline in the working age population growth rate 
(equivalent to a 20% points decline in the youth dependency ratio) raises the level of 
labour productivity by about 6% in the long run. 
 
These effects have some support from empirical growth regressions. The rate of 
population growth usually enters negatively in growth regressions (see for example 
Mankiw et al. but also DG ECFIN (2003)). Also Temple (1999), in a recent survey of 
the empirical growth literature, concludes that empirical studies tend to find a (weak) 
negative correlation between population growth and per capita income43. 
 
Obviously a major shortcoming of this model is the fact that it only explains a small 
fraction of the variation in productivity growth, namely the part that is due to capital 
deepening and leaves unexplained the medium to long term movements of TFP. Also, 
in the context of demographic scenarios, one can ask the question whether the 
predictions made by this model on the effects of ageing on productivity are realistic 
since it excludes the possibly adverse effects of an ageing labour force on the rate of 
technical progress (e.g. ageing may lead to a slowdown in the creation and adoption 
of new ideas and techniques). 
 
In the following paragraphs two possible extensions of the standard framework are 
presented which could provide another channel linking population ageing to 
productivity growth. Also the quantitative magnitude of these effects is assessed. The 
first model is a simple extension of the Solow model by adding human capital. The 
human capital extension of the standard growth model has been found to be more 
successful in replicating growth patterns in the empirical growth literature (see 
Mankiw et al.). The Mankiw et al formulation retains the assumption that the long run 
TFP trend is exogenous – see discussion under ‘Extension I’. The recent endogenous 
growth literature goes one step further and endogenises TFP itself by postulating 
ideas or knowledge production functions. We call this variant ‘Extension II’.  
 
 
2.2 : EXTENSION I : HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
 
Mankiw et al. assume that society devotes a certain fraction of current output to the 
accumulation of human capital in the form of spending on education. Their human 
capital accumulation equation is similar to the formulation used in the case of 
physical capital : 
 
(6) 1)1((.) −−+= tht HYsH δ  
 
Human capital investment is a constant share of total GDP and it depreciates at a rate 
equal to physical capital. Although this formulation conveys the idea that human 
capital is subject to depreciation, in the same way as physical capital (and therefore a 
                                                 
43 Temple offers endogeneity problems as a possible explanation. 
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 change in the age structure of the labour force could potentially have an effect on the 
average level of efficiency of workers), demographic effects do not come into play in 
this formulation since human capital investment is not proportional to the youth 
population but proportional to GDP. In other words this formulation implicitly 
assumes that when the share of the youth population is declining, education spending 
per student increases. One should not necessarily assume that this will be the case 
automatically but one should try to separate out both effects conceptually. In the 
empirical analysis conducted for the 2003 Review, ECFIN made an attempt in that 
direction by introducing a dynamic relationship for the average human capital 
endowment which is based on the concept of human capital investment per person. 
(see Appendix at the end of this annex for a more detailed derivation). 
 
(7)  111)1( −−− +−−−= tytywtwwt Ydeprathhgwdhh λλ
 
In this formulation the average human capital stock of the labour force can be 
expressed as a function of the education level at entry into the labour force ( ); the 
youth dependency ratio (ydeprat); and the rate of depreciation of human capital (dh). 
This formulation suggests that to the extent that human capital depreciates, the youth 
dependency ratio should enter a TFP regression positively. Obviously this effect can 
be counteracted by increasing the human capital endowment of the labour force and 
therefore measures of the level of education would be expected to play a role as well. 
The TFP regression that was estimated had the following general form : 
yh
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As shown in the Review (2003), the youth dependency ratio is significant in this 
regression and has a positive sign. The first question to ask is whether this effect can 
potentially overturn the positive effect of population ageing on productivity as 
predicted by the conventional model ? The answer is yes. According to current 
estimates, the youth dependency ratio has declined from around 0.4 to 0.25 in 2000. 
A further small decline is forecast over the coming decades. This additional decline 
will be accompanied by a reduction in the growth rate of the working age population 
by about 1% in some Member States. According to our estimates, without 
compensating educational measures, the overall decline of about 0.2 in the youth 
dependency ratio leads to a decline in TFP of around 14 ½% in the long run. 
However, this is based on "old" demographic assumptions, which are much more 
pessimistic than the recent Eurostat demographic scenario released in 2005 
(EUROPOP2004 and the AWG variant). We know from earlier that the capital 
deepening effect of a 1% decline in the growth rate of the labour force is of the order 
of magnitude of +6%. Consequently, the net effect (TFP + capital deepening) of a 
decline in the birth rate on the level of labour productivity is of the order of 
magnitude of -8 ½% in the long run (i.e. roughly 0.2 off the labour productivity 
growth rate)44. Again, it should be borne in mind that this figure is only illustrative, 
as the demographic assumptions are not consistent with the most recent ones used in 
                                                 
44 While the overall effect of ageing on labour productivity is negative, it is difficult due to the 
complex dynamics involved to predict how the effect will be distributed over time i.e. how much has 
already been realised and how much remains still to be experienced is an empirical issue which 
demands additional analysis.    
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 the main text. Indeed, scenario 3 in section 6.1.2, based on the same elasticity of TFP 
growth to youth dependency ratio (table1 above) shows that the negative impact of 
decreasing youth dependency should be significantly lower. The second question to 
ask is : are these results plausible ? One possibility to check this is to retrieve the 
implied human capital depreciation figure which would be consistent with the 
estimated effect of the youth dependency ratio on TFP. This is done by simulating the 
theoretical model with a shock that corresponds to the decline in the growth rate of 
the youth population of 1%, which generates the projected decline of the youth 
dependency ratio of 20% points (0.4 to 0.2) in the long run for a whole range of 
alternative human capital depreciation rates.  
 
The following table provides results on the effect of a decline in the population 
growth rate of 1% on TFP, capital intensity and labour productivity under alternative 
assumptions on the rate of depreciation of human capital. 
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 TABLE 2 : EFFECTS OF DEPRECIATION OF HUMAN CAPITAL 
       1970   1980   2000   2020   2050   2100   2500 
Year  0    10 30  50     80     130    500 
 
δ =0.0, Human Capital after 40 years: 100% 
    YL_PCER       0.01   0.55   2.31   3.78   5.14   6.09   6.54 
    HW_PCER       0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
    TFPADJ_PCER   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
    KL_PCER       0.03   1.60   6.74  11.18  15.40  18.42  19.86 
 
δ =0.0025, Human Capital after 40 years: 90% 
YL_PCER       0.01   0.47   1.80   2.72   3.32   3.44   3.21 
HW_PCER       0.00  -0.10  -0.60  -1.15  -1.86  -2.57  -3.12 
TFPADJ_PCER   0.00  -0.07  -0.39  -0.75  -1.21  -1.68  -2.04 
KL_PCER       0.03   1.57   6.43  10.35  13.70  15.63  16.12 
 
δ =0.005, Human Capital after 40 years: 82% 
YL_PCER       0.01   0.40   1.32   1.74   1.69   1.15   0.49 
HW_PCER       0.00  -0.21  -1.17  -2.23  -3.53  -4.79  -5.68 
TFPADJ_PCER   0.00  -0.13  -0.76  -1.45  -2.30  -3.14  -3.73 
KL_PCER       0.03   1.55   6.14   9.57  12.15  13.21  13.05 
 
δ =0.01, Human Capital after 40 years: 67% 
YL_PCER       0.01   0.25   0.42  -0.02  -1.12  -2.57  -3.69 
HW_PCER       0.00  -0.42  -2.24  -4.16  -6.38  -8.38  -9.61 
TFPADJ_PCER   0.00  -0.27  -1.46  -2.73  -4.19  -5.53  -6.36 
KL_PCER       0.03   1.50   5.58   8.15   9.45   9.22   8.33 
 
δ =0.02, Human Capital after 40 years: 45% 
YL_PCER       0.01  -0.04  -1.16  -2.93  -5.36  -7.72  -9.12 
HW_PCER       0.00  -0.81  -4.12  -7.31 -10.64 -13.31 -14.70 
TFPADJ_PCER   0.00  -0.53  -2.70  -4.81  -7.05  -8.86  -9.82 
KL_PCER       0.03   1.41   4.57   5.75   5.28   3.62   2.23 
 
δ =0.03, Human Capital after 40 years: 30% 
YL_PCER       0.01  -0.31  -2.51  -5.18  -8.35 -11.04 -12.48 
HW_PCER       0.00  -1.18  -5.70  -9.71 -13.60 -16.46 -17.85 
TFPADJ_PCER   0.00  -0.77  -3.74  -6.42  -9.07 -11.03 -12.00 
KL_PCER       0.03   1.32   3.69   3.83   2.26  -0.04  -1.54 
 
δ =0.04, Human Capital after 40 years: 20% 
YL_PCER       0.01  -0.57  -3.65  -6.96 -10.53 -13.34 -14.76 
HW_PCER       0.00  -1.53  -7.03 -11.58 -15.74 -18.63 -20.00 
TFPADJ_PCER   0.00  -1.00  -4.62  -7.69 -10.53 -12.54 -13.50 
KL_PCER       0.03   1.24   2.92   2.27   0.00  -2.59  -4.10 
 
δ =0.05, Human Capital after 40 years: 13% 
YL_PCER       0.01  -0.81  -4.63  -8.37 -12.17 -15.01 -16.41 
HW_PCER       0.00  -1.86  -8.15 -13.06 -17.33 -20.20 -21.55 
TFPADJ_PCER   0.00  -1.21  -5.38  -8.69 -11.63 -13.64 -14.59 
KL_PCER       0.03   1.16   2.25   1.00  -1.71  -4.46  -5.96 
 
YL = Labour Productivity HW = Efficiency of Labour  
TFPADJ = TFP adjusted for labour efficiency KL = Capital intensity 
With zero human capital depreciation, the model replicates the effect of the standard 
neoclassical (Solow) growth model. Population growth has a positive effect on labour 
productivity which is equal to the theoretical prediction. It should be noted that this is 
generated by an increase in capital intensity of 18%. With assumptions of human 
capital depreciation, there is a negative TFP effect which starts to dominate the 
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 capital deepening effect for depreciation rates in a range larger than 0.5% per year. In 
order to obtain a long run productivity effect of the order of magnitude estimated in 
the present note, namely a reduction in labour productivity of about 14 ½% (from a 
decline in the youth dependency ratio from .4 to .2) one has to assume a rate of 
depreciation of between 3% to 4 %. As can be seen from the table, this would imply 
that the average worker, at the end of his career, would have an efficiency level which 
is 20% to 30% compared to the level at entry into the labour force. These depreciation 
rates appear large. Two observations should be added when interpreting these 
numbers. The estimates could potentially be biased upwards. The youth dependency 
ratio may capture some sectoral changes in the economy, possibly related to the 
expected shift in demand to low productivity growth service sectors, associated with 
the shifting demand patterns of an ageing society. Secondly, these estimates could 
reflect certain features of the innovation process such as, for example, resource 
constraints in the form of (young) researchers and entrepreneurs capable of 
generating and implementing new ideas (instead of refining existing ideas), a factor 
stressed in the endogenous growth literature surveyed in the next section.  
 
2.3 : EXTENSION II : ENDOGENIZING TFP GROWTH (KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
FUNCTION) 
 
 The results presented above suggest that a decline in the birth rate will eventually 
lead to a lower level of TFP and labour productivity (relative to their long term 
trends). New growth theory arrives at a more pessimistic view on the relationship 
between population ageing and productivity. The effect is intrinsic to the way in 
which the creation of knowledge is seen in these models. The argument basically goes 
as follows. Starting from the conventional neoclassical production function where 
TFP is exogenous, the new growth theory regards TFP as being proportional to the 
stock of knowledge accumulated by conscious efforts. Knowledge must be produced 
just like other goods, using especially human resources. Typically the following type 
of knowledge production function is postulated : 
 
(9)  φλχ 1, −=Δ ttAt TFPLTFP
 
Where  is the amount of labour devoted to R&D activities. Total labour must be 
allocated between the research and the production sector. Just like in the conventional 
growth model there exists a balanced growth path with a constant investment share 
and a constant share of workers in the two sectors for any growth rate of the labour 
force. Notice that the long run growth of labour productivity is still equal to the 
growth rate of TFP. But from (9) one can now determine the growth rate of TFP as a 
function of the growth rate of the population :  
tAL ,
 
(10) φ
λγγ −== 1withgg ALTFP  
and  equal to population growth under a balanced growth assumption. And even 
more importantly, population growth is the only source of TFP growth in the long 
run. The central messages from these types of models in the context of population 
ageing are: 
AL
g
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 1. The growth rate of TFP declines proportionally to the growth rate of the 
population45. 
 
2. TFP growth can only be prevented from declining by an ever increasing share 
of workers allocated to R&D activities.  
 
This view is expressed forcefully by Jones (2002) by giving an alternative 
interpretation to the long term growth process of the US economy. With standard 
growth accounting assumptions (based on the basic neoclassical growth model) the 
US economy is often portrayed as growing along a balanced growth path, namely 
along a fairly constant growth rate of TFP (which may have increased in recent 
years), with constant investment rates and stable employment rates (stable NAIRU 
and stable trend participation rates). A growth accounting exercise which is based on 
endogenous growth models arrives at different conclusions. Firstly, the balanced 
growth path, as determined by the growth rate of the population, is in fact very small 
and lies at 1/3 of a per cent for the US. The actual growth rate of labour productivity, 
averaging about 2% in the US (from 1950 to 1993) was generated via the (permanent) 
shift of resources into knowledge (R&D) activities. According to Jones two factors 
have been responsible for sustaining these 2% growth rates, namely rising educational 
attainment levels and rising R&D spending shares. In this context, the annual average 
growth rate of human capital over this period (educational attainment) was equal to 
0.63% while the growth rate of the R&D labour force was estimated to be 4.8% per 
annum (note : without these human capital and R&D growth rates, US labour 
productivity growth would have averaged only 1/3 of a % over this period). The 
effect of physical capital on growth is relatively small46.  
 
2.4 : QUANTIFICATION OF EFFECTS  
 
As emphasised above, the more recent endogenous growth models have a radically 
different view on the determinants of long term (balanced) growth. While the 
‘Extension I’ models regard the same variables to be important for growth as 
‘Extension II’ models, the former emphasise long term level effects while the latter 
emphasise growth rate effects. It is interesting to ask whether the quantitative 
predictions concerning population, investment and knowledge are very different when 
one calculates level multipliers over very long time horizons. This is attempted in 
table 3, where we compare standardized shocks between the Jones model and DG 
ECFIN’s Review estimates. 
 
Interestingly the level implications of the results based on the two approaches are 
similar when calculated over longer term horizons. This is true for both the effects of 
population ageing on labour productivity as well as for the effect of possible 
compensating measures. The most important result from the point of view of 
demographic scenarios is the sign difference for the effect of population growth on 
labour productivity between the standard Solow model and both the extension I and 
                                                 
45 While this refers to the global population growth rate, it is not clear under what conditions countries 
would benefit or lose from these trends. 
46 This effect cannot be directly compared to the effect of capital deepening in conventional growth 
accounting exercises. In Jones the capital effect is based on the capital / output ratio while in traditional 
exercises the effect is based on the capital / labour ratio. Obviously the latter increases more than the 
former.  
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 extension II models. The standard Solow model predicts a positive effect from a fall 
in the population growth rate (due to the capital deepening effects), while the two 
alternatives predict a negative response ranging from 0.2 (Extension 1) to 0.3 
(Extension 2) off the growth rate of labour productivity. Given that the labour 
productivity forecasts included in the main text already allow for the positive capital 
deepening effects of ageing, this would imply that these forecasts would have to be 
revised downwards by the full TFP effects. Given the projected declines over the 
coming decades in the EU15 (-0.5%) and EU10 (-1%) populations of working age, 
this would imply that the labour productivity projections for these aggregates may 
need to be reduced by between a ¼-½ a % point if one accepts that ageing is negative 
for TFP.  
 
TABLE 3  : LONG RUN LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY MULTIPLIERS FROM EXTENSION’S  
I AND II (LEVEL EFFECTS AFTER 50 YEARS*) 
 Jones(1) ECFIN(2) 
PHYSICAL INVESTMENT SHARE 
(Increasing by 1% point) 
2.1%(1a) 2.4% 
YEARS OF EDUCATION 
(Increase by 1 year) 
7%(1b) 12.8% 
R&D SHARE 
(Increase by 1% point of GDP***) 
16%(1c) 17.7% 
WORKING AGE POPULATION GROWTH 
(1% reduction of growth rate**) 
(-2.5%, -16%)(1d) -8.7% (2a) 
 
(1)   Results reported in this column are own calculations on the basis of information provided in Jones     
(2002).  The results from Jones, as with the ECFIN results, include the net effect of the positive 
capital deepening and negative TFP effects of changes to the population of working age.   
(1a) Calculation is based on information provided in Jones (2002), Tables 1 and 2. 
(1b) Based on information given in the Jones text on page 227. 
(1c) Based on information provided in footnote 20 of Jones text. 
(1d) Jones cannot pin down a precise estimate of the parameter γ  but gives values in the range    
between .05 and .33. 
(2)   Results are taken from Tables A4 and A5 of chapter 2, EU Economy Review 2003.  
(2a) Figure gives the net effect of the fall in TFP (-14.7) and the rise in capital intensity (+6.0). 
* Most of the level effects are evident after 25-30 years. 
* *Equivalent to a 20% points decline in the youth dependency ratio. 
*** A 1% point of GDP increase in R&D would represent an increase of at least 50% on current EU levels. 
  
Finally, it must be stressed that although the results reported in Table 3 contradict the 
results of the standard growth model, this is not a fundamental contradiction. The 
contradiction occurs because extensions I and II both model TFP whilst it is 
exogenous in the standard model. All three models make very similar predictions 
concerning the effects of a change in the investment rate, a change in population 
growth on capital deepening and the effects of a change in TFP. This point is stressed 
in Table A3 of the Review study.  
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 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
To conclude, this annex should be seen as an alternative approach for looking at the 
possibly negative effects of ageing on TFP and labour productivity.  It is clear that the 
complex dynamics surrounding this issue, allied to age-related sectoral shifts and 
modelling difficulties, cast a large degree of uncertainty over the estimates given at 
the end of section 2.  However, on the basis of the present analysis, it would appear 
that ageing has the potential to substantially reduce long run labour productivity 
growth rates in the existing and new Member States, especially the latter.  
 
To offset the potentially negative effects of ageing on TFP growth, it appears 
reasonable to conclude that many countries will have no option but to embark on a 
sustained, and extensive process, of human capital and R&D investments.  
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 APPENDIX TO ANNEX 2 :  HUMAN CAPITAL, AGEING AND GROWTH 
 
Model : Neoclassical production function: 
 
(1)  αα )(1 ww NhAKY −=
 
Y: output 
K: capital 
wh : average human capital of  working age population 
wN : working age population 
 
Demographics : Youth Population 
 
(2)  yt
y
t NgyN 1)1( −+=
 
Youth population ( ) grows with exogenous rate . yN yg
 
Population of working age: 
 
(2)   yt
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t
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wλ : exit-rate of  wN
yλ : exit-rate from  yN
 
Investment: 
 
(4)  t
i
tt YsI =
 
Investment is a constant share of GDP. 
 
Capital: 
(5)  1)1( −−+= ttt KdkIK
 
Human capital : Human capital of  a (survivor) in the working age population evolves 
according to :  
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i.e. it depreciates at rate dh. Therefore total human capital evolves as follows: 
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or 
 
(7b)  )/1)(1/()1/()1)(1( 111 −−− +++−−= tytywtwwt nwygwhhgwdhh λλ
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